Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 107

Issue 2

Article 3

2018

The Timing of Testation
Mark Glover
University of Wyoming

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Glover, Mark (2018) "The Timing of Testation," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 107: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol107/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

THE TIMING OF TESTATION
Mark Glover'
ABSTRACT

An adult can execute her last will whenever she wants. She can do so on her
eighteenth birthday, or she can wait until she is on her deathbed She can also
execute her last will at any point between these two extremes. While the timing of
testation is up to the individualtestator, her choice has important implicationsfor
the law. These implications have been recognized primarily in the realm of
will-interpretation,as when testationoccurs can affect how courts attributemeaning
to a will's words. By contrast, the implications of testation'stimingfor the law of
will-authenticationhave been overlooked
Will-authenticationis the process by which the law separatespurportedwills that
testatorsintended to serve as evidence of their estateplansfrom those that decedents
did not want to be given legal effect upon their deaths. This article argues that the
extent to which the testator's intent will be fulfilled if a correct will-authentication
decision is made should be an important considerationfor policymakers when
crafting the law of will-authentication. Additionally, the article argues that the
timing of testation can provide policymakers evidence of the likelihood that the
testator'sintent will be carriedout if a will is correctly authenticatedBy explaining
how the timing of testation shouldinform how the law authenticateswills, this article
provides policymakers a fresh perspective through which to evaluate potential
reforms of the law.
In addition to highlightingthe theoreticalimplications of testation'stiming, this
article provides an empirical analysis of testation's timing which considers an
original data set of over eighteen-hundred wills that were probated in Hamilton
County, Ohio, in 2014. By comparing the date of execution of these wills with the
date on which the testator die4 this analysisprovides a glimpse of when testation in
fact occurs. Ultimately, when considered alongside the theoretical implications of
testation's timing, this original empirical analysis can assist policymakers in
crafting the law of will-authentication.

' Associate Professor of Law, UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING COLLEGE OF LAW; LL.M., HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL, 2011; J.D., magna cum laude, BosroN UNIVERSrrY SCHOOL OF LAW, 2008. Thanks to the
University of Wyoming College of Law for research support. Thanks also to those who provided helpful
feedback at the Wyoming Junior Faculty Forum and the 112" Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools.
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THE TIMING OF TESTATION
INTRODUCTION

Testation, or the act of executing a will,2 can occur at any time during the
testator's adult life.' The timing of testation relative to the testator's death has
important implications for how the law should identify and interpret the testator's
intent. Some of these implications have been recognized and have influenced the
development of the law." Others, however, have been overlooked, and consequently
opportunities for reform have been missed. This article seeks to at least partially
address this oversight by highlighting the role that testation's timing can play in
shaping one aspect of the law of wills, namely the law of will-authentication.
Will-authentication is the process by which the law separates purported wills that
testators intended to serve as evidence of their estate plans from those that decedents
did not want to be given legal effect upon their deaths.s This process has significant
consequences because the law's primary objective is to carry out the decedent's
intent.' Thus, a method of will-authentication that poorly differentiates authentic
wills and inauthentic wills undermines the law's primary objective, while a method
that accurately distinguishes authentic wills from inauthentic wills furthers the law's
primary objective.
Accuracy, however, is not the only factor that policymakers should consider
when selecting a method of will-authentication. Instead, they should consider both
the benefits and the costs of authenticating a will in which the testator's intent is

2 See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthinnous Meddling: An Instranentalist Theory of Testamentary
Restraintson ConjugalandReligiousChoices, 1999 U. ILL. L REv. 1273,1281 n.42 (cxplaining that "the
word 'testation' refers to a property owner's effective designation, by will, of the persons who shall
receive his property upon his death"). If a decedent dies with a legally effective will, she is said to have
died "testate." See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 43 (9th ed.

2013).
' Persons who are under a specified age lack the legal capacity to execute a will. UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-501 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS. OF UNIF. STATE LAws 2010) ("An individual 18 or
more years of age who is of sound mind may make a will."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
AND (THER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.2(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see generally Mark Glover,
Rethinking the Testamentary Capacity ofMinors, 79 Mo. L REv. 69 (2014) (exploring the rationale of
the testamentary incapacity of minors). In addition to this age requirement, a donor must also possess
a requisite level of mental capacity to execute a legally effective will. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 8.1

(AM. LAW INST. 2003).

" See ifra notes 125-137 and accompanying text (discussing rules of construction); infra notes
151-155 and accompanying text (discussing mortmain statutes); infra notes 158-169 and accompanying
text (discussing the doctrines of undue influence, duress, and fraud).
s See Mark Glover, Minimizing Probate-ErrorRisk, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335, 336 (2016)
(explaining that the law "differentiates wills from non-wills" and that the method that law employs to
make this distinction is "not intended to delineate an arbitrary boundary between what is and is not a will",
but is instead "meant to distinguish authentic wills from inauthentic wills").
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRopERry: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§

10.1 cmt

c

(AM. LAW INST. 2003) ("The main function of the law in this field is to facilitate rather than regulate. The
law serves this function by establishing rules under which sufficiently reliable determinations can be made
regarding the content of the donor's intention."); DUKEMINIER & SrrKOFF, supra note 2, at I ("Most of
the law of succession is concerned with enabling posthumous enforcement of the actual intent of the
decedent or, failing this, giving effect to the decedent's probable intent").
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expressed.7 On the one hand, accurate will-authentication decisions produce the
benefit of fulfilling the testator's intent. On the other hand, the court's task of
deciphering the testator's intent can generate costs in the form of time, money, and
effort expended during the probate process.' Policymakers should ensure that the
benefit of their chosen method of will-authentication outweighs its costs.
In recent years, the scholarly discourse surrounding will-authentication has
focused on the benefits and costs of various methods of will-authentication.' Absent
from the debate, however, is recognition that not all wills have the same expected
benefit. Generally, the discussion assumes that the same benefit is reaped each time
an accurate will-authentication decision is made. This, however, is a false
assumption. To be sure, some wills substantially express the testator's intent, and
therefore an accurate authenticity decision results in the testator's estate being
disposed in accordance with her wishes. Other wills, by contrast, do not correctly
express the testator's intent, and consequently an accurate authenticity decision does
not result in the complete fulfillment of the testator's intended estate plan.
Within this context, this article makes two primary arguments. The first is that,
when evaluating the overall costs and benefits of a method of will-authentication,
policymakers should recognize that some wills produce a relatively large benefit and
others produce a relatively small benefit. Thus, if policymakers have more
confidence that a will accurately reflects the testator's intent, then they should
tolerate greater decision costs during probate. Conversely, if policymakers have less
confidence regarding a will's benefit, then they should tolerate fewer decision costs.
Only by recognizing the differences in the expected benefit of wills can
policymakers accurately evaluate the costs and benefits of a particular method of
will-authentication.
This article's second primary argument is that testation's timing can help
policymakers to gauge the expected benefit of wills. If testation occurs too early,
then changing circumstances over the testator's life might suggest that a will does
not accurately express the testator's intended estate plan at death.'o Iftestation occurs
too late, then old age or ill health might render the testator particularly vulnerable to
undue influence or other types of overreaching, which raises similar concerns that a
7
See Adam J. Hirsch, Testationand the Mind, 74 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 285, 367 (2017) ("Like other
landscapes, the legal landscape is an environment of scarce resources. The success and even wisdom of a
rule depends in no small measure on its frugality."); James Lindgren, The Fall ofFormalism, 55 ALB. L.
REV. 1009, 1033 (1992) ("[W]e should ask .. . whether [a method of will-authentication] promotes the
intent of the testator at an acceptable administrative cost."); Peter T. Wendel, Wills Act Compliance and
the Harmless ErrorApproack Flawed Narrative Equals Flawed Analysis?, 95 OR. L. REV. 337, 390
(2017) ("The challenge in creating and applying a Wills Act is how to balance the competing public policy
considerations of testator's intent, costs of administration, and potential for misconduct").
gSee Wendel, supra note 7, at 382 (explaining "that one of the important public policy considerations
... is ... the costs of administration associated with ascertaining and giving effect to testator'sintent").
' See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Irresolute Testators, Clearand Convincing Wills Law, 73 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 3, 63-74 (2016) (discussing the costs and benefits ofthe clear and convincing evidence standard);
David Horton, Wills Law on the Ground, 62 UCLA L. REv. 1094,1138-46 (2015) (discussing the costs
and benefits of the harmless error rule); Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform
Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. JL. REFORM 855, 877-82 (2012) (discussing the costs and benefits of the
harmless error rule and the reformation doctrine).
"o See infra Section II.A.
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will does not accurately express the testator's intended estate plan." Under either
scenario, testation's timing diminishes the likelihood that a will accurately reflects
the testator's intent at death, and it therefore also reduces the will's expected benefit.
Through these two insights this article provides a framework for evaluating the
law of will-authentication. First, because testation's timing affects the probability
that wills accurately reflect intended estate plans by either raising or alleviating
concerns regarding changed circumstances and testator vulnerability,'1 2 it can serve
as a barometer of a will's expected benefit. Second, with a better sense of the
expected benefit of wills, policymakers can enjoy a clearer picture of how the law
should balance the costs and benefits of authenticating wills. In this way, testation's
timing can assist policymakers in crafting the law of will-authentication.
This fresh perspective of the implications of testation's timing provides
theoretical guidelines for analyzing the law, but this article goes beyond theoretical
discourse by providing an empirical analysis of testation's timing that can aid
policymakers in selecting the appropriate method of will-authentication. In
particular, this empirical analysis considers an original data set of over eighteen
hundred wills that were probated in Hamilton County, Ohio, in 2014.'" By comparing
the date of execution of these wills with the date on which the testator died, this
analysis provides not only a glimpse of when testation in fact occurs but also a
suggestion of the confidence that policymakers should have in the extent to which
wills accurately represent the testator's intent. When considered alongside previous
studies of testation, this original study suggests that trends in the timing of testation
change over time and consequently that the law of will-authentication should change
as well.
The article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the law and policy of
will-authentication, including how the costs and benefits of the authentication.
process should inform the development of the law. Part II then explores how the
timing of testation can provide insights regarding the expected benefit of wills,
insights that ultimately can aid policymakers in evaluating potential reforms. Part Ill
shifts the article's focus from theory to reality by providing empirical evidence of
when testation actually occurs, including an analysis of an original data set of wills
of recently deceased testators. Finally, Part IV applies Part i11's data to the theory
presented in Parts I and II to provide suggestions for reform.
I. THE AuTHENTICATION OF WILLS

A testator has broad liberty to decide how her estate should be distributed upon
death.1 4 As the Restatement (Third) of Property (the "Restatement") explains, "[t]he
organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is freedom of
disposition," and as such, "[p]roperty owners have the nearly unrestricted right to

" See infra Section II.B.
1 See Infra Part 11.
"See infra Subsection Il.C.ii.
'4 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition,58 ST. LOUIs U.
LJ. 643, 643-45 (2014).
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dispose of their property as they please."" With freedom of disposition as the law's
organizing principle, fulfillment of the testator's intent naturally emerges as the law's
primary objective.' 6
After all, if the law did not honor the testator's intent, freedom of disposition
would be illusory. The testator simply would not enjoy the liberty that the law
purports to grant her. Thus, the Restatement makes clear that that the law
"implements [freedom of disposition through] two well-accepted propositions: (1)
that the controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document
is the donor's intention; and (2) that the donor's intention is given effect to the
maximum extent allowed by law." 17 Similarly, the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC")
stresses that one of its "underlying purposes and policies" is "to discover and make
effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property."'" Both the
Restatement and the UPC reflect the widely-held view that the primary goal of the
law of wills is to carry out the testator's intent.' 9
In pursuit of this goal, the law turns to the language of the testator's will to
provide evidence of how she wanted her estate distributed.20 Before the court can
look to a will to determine the intent expressed therein, however, it must first decide
whether the testator intended the court to consider that document as evidence of her
intended estate plan. 21 Put simply, the court must identify the testator's will before it
can interpret it. A testator might not want the court to consider a purported will

's RESTATEMENT (THIURD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cnt a
(AM. LAW INST. 2003); see alsoCantrell v. Cantrell, No. M2002-02883-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 3044907,
at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2004) ("A fundamental principle of the law of wills is that a testator is
entitled to dispose of the testator's property as he or she sees fit, regardless of any perceived injustice that
may result from such a choice.'); Mark Glover, Freedom of Inheritance, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 283, 284
(2017) ("Freedom of disposition is the cornerstone of the modern law of succession. Individuals enjoy
nearly unfettered discretion to decide how property should be distributed upon death."(footnote omitted));
Reid Kress Weisbord, Willsfor Everyone: HelpingIndividuals Opt Out oflIntestacy, 53 B.C. L REV. 877,
882 (2012) ("The most fundamental guiding principle of American inheritance law is testamentary
freedom-that the person who owns property during life has the power to direct its disposition at death.").
6
See Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem--The Case Against Holographic Wills, 74
TENN. L. REv. 93, 96 (2006) ("The primary goal of the American law of wills is the effectuation of the
decedent's testamentary intent"); Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classificationof Gratuitous
Tranrfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1941) ("One fundamental proposition is that, under a legal system
recognizing the individualistic institution of private property and granting the owner the power to
determine his successors in ownership, the general philosophy of the courts should favor giving effect to
an intentional exercise of that power.").
" RESTATEMENf (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WIuS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§

10.1 cnt a

(AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also Mark Glover, A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 569, 569 (2016) ("[A] fumdamental principle within the law of succession [is] that intent, or more
specifically testamentary intent, is the cornerstone ofa will.").
'UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS. OF UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010).

'9 Cf Melanie B. Leslie, EnforcingFamily Promises:Reliance, Reciprocity, and RelationalContract,
77 N.C. L REV. 551, 552-53 n.l (1999) ("Most scholars agree that giving effect to testamentary intent is
the primary objective of wills law.").
I Mahoney v. Grainger, 186 N.E. 86, 87 (Mass. 1933) ("A will duly executed and allowed by the
court must ... be accepted as the final expression of the intent of the person executing it").
21
See Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 650-52 (distinguishing the task of authenticating a will from the task
of construing it).
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because she made it as a rough draft and never gave her final assent to it.22 Likewise,
she might not want a purported will to serve as evidence of her intent because a
wrongdoer attempted to fraudulently benefit from her estate by submitting a forgery
to probate.23 Will-authentication is the process by which the law makes this
distinction between a purported will that the testator intended the court to use as
evidence of her estate plan and a purported will that the testator did not intend the
court to consider. 24

A. Law
Although the details of the law of will-authentication vary from state to state,
in general, the conventional law authenticates wills by relying upon various
will-execution formalities to provide evidence of authenticity. 25 These formalities
normally require that a will be written, signed by the testator, and attested by two
witnesses.26 In some states, these primary formalities are accompanied by ancillary
requirements, such as that the signatures must appear at the end of the document and
the testator and witnesses must be in each other's presence at the time they sign the
will.27 If the testator complies with these formalities, the law presumes that the will
is authentic, and if the testator does not comply, the law presumes the opposite.2!
Furthermore, under the conventional law's rule of strict compliance, the presumption
of inauthenticity that results from the testator's fiilure to comply is conclusive.29 The
court is not authorized to consider other evidence that might suggest the
noncompliant will is authentic."o
The rationale underlying these formalities is that they provide robust evidence of
a will's authenticity.' The court must authenticate a will after the testator's death,
and as such, the testator cannot testify regarding whether she truly intended the will

2 See Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1065 (1996) ("[Mjany
persons are given to speak and write off the cuff, many persons commit to words tentative drafts of their
wills and then have second thoughts when the time for inking draws near."); John H. Langboin, Substantial
Compliance With the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L REv. 489, 494-95 (1975) (explaining that "the danger exists
that [the testator] may make seeming testamentary dispositions ... without ... finality ofintention" and
observing that "[n]ot every expression that 'I want you to have the house when I'm gone' is meant as a
will").
' See Mark Glover, Decompling the Law of Wi-Executio, 88 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 597, 618 (2014)
(recognizing the possibility of "the fraudulent admission of a will that the testator never executed").
' See Glover, supra note 5, at 337.
2 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 147-48. In addition to providing evidence of
authenticity, will formalities might also serve other purposes. See Mark Glover, The TherapeuticFunction
of Testamentary Formality, 61 KAN. L REv. 139, 139 (2012) ("[F]ormal will-execution requirements
bolster the overall therapoutic potential of estate planning.").
2 DUKEMINIBR & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 148-49.

" Glover, supra note 5, at 342.
2 Mark Glover, Probate-ErrorCosts, 49 CONN. L. REV. 613, 625 (2016).
2 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 153; Glover, supranote 3, at 101.
3 See Langbein, supra note 22, at 489 ("The most minute defect in formal compliance is held to void
the will, no matter how abundant the evidence that the defect was inconsequential.").
31
Id at 492 ("The primary purpose ofthe Wills Act has always been to provide the court with reliable
evidence of testamentary intent. . . .").
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to be legally effective." To overcome this evidentiary difficulty, the law requires
that the testator comply with the prescribed will-execution formalities." These
requirements ensure that the court has ample evidence of the testator's intent.' After
all, few testators would complete the process of writing out a will, signing it, and
then locating two witnesses without intending the document to be legally effective.
Although the prescribed will-execution formalities provide evidence of
authenticity, they also represent potential stumbling blocks for a testator who wants
to leave behind a legally effective will but fails to comply due to ignorance or
mistake.3 1 When the law conclusively presumes that all noncompliant wills are
inauthentic, there is a risk that a substantial number of truly authentic wills are denied
probate because of the testator's honest mistake." In response to this concern, critics
of the conventional law have proposed the harmless error rule as an alternative to the
rule of strict compliance.
The harmless error rule replaces the conventional law's conclusive presumption
of inauthenticity with a rebuttable presumption. Whereas under the rule of strict
compliance the court will not consider extrinsic evidence that suggests the testator
intended a noncompliant will to be legally effective,' under the harmless error rule
the court is granted discretion to consider such evidence."' Thus, if a purported will
32

33
34

Id at 501.
See id
See id at 501-02.

supranote 2, at 153 ("A competent person not subject to undue influence,
duress, or fraud is unlikely to execute an instrument in strict compliance with all the Wills Act fonnalities
unless the person intends the instrument to be his wilL'); Kathelcn R. Guzman, Intents and Purposes,60
KAN. L REV. 305, 311 n.18 (2011) ("Few people would undergo [the will-execution] ceremony without
holding testamentary intent.").
' See Mark Glover, FormalExecution and InformalRevocation: Manfestations ofProbate'sFamily
ProtectionPolicy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411, 432 (2009) ("[W]ill formalities are barriers to the valid
execution of a will. Put differently, absent formalities, testators would more easily exercise their
testamentary power."); Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The
Searchfor a Compromise Between FormalityandAdjudicativeJustice, 34 CONN. L. REv. 453,457 (2002)
("[Flormality rules for will execution prevent mistakes about intent and provide a means for expressing
intent. At the same time, in a significant number of cases they may fiustrate not only an individual
testator's intent but also the principle objective of the law of wills.").
*' See Kelly, supra note 9, at 880 ("Currently, the concern about [false-negative outcomes] may be
greater than the concern about [false-positive outcomes]. Most disputes over execution formalities ...
seem to involve technical defects ... with little or no risk of fraud. If these cases are representative of all
cases, perhaps there is a much greater chance of denying probate to a document the testator did intend to
be her will . .. than probating a document the testator did not intent to be her will . . ..") (footnote omitted).
'llhe harmless error rule was first championed by Professor John Langbein. See John H. Langbein,
Excusing Harmless Error in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in
ProbateLaw, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1987). Since Langbein's call for change, the harmless error rulc has
garnered widespread support from law reformers, as evidenced by its adoption by both the Uniform
Probate Code and the Restatement (Third) of Property. See iqfra, note 43.
" Mark Glover, In Defense of the Harmless ErrorRule's Clear andConvincing Evidence StandardA Response to ProfessorBaron, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REv. ONLINE 289, 291-92 (2016).
* See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
4 See RESTATEMEN (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt b
(AM. LAW INsT. 2003) (explaining that "[tiho purposive question [under the harmless error rule] is
whether the evidence regarding the overall conduct of the testator establishes, in a clear and convincing
manner, that the testator adopted the document as his or her will.").
3 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF,

2018--2019

THE TIMING OF TESTATION

229

does not comply with the prescribed formalities, the court presumes that the testator
did not intend it to be legally effective, but it can consider extrinsic evidence that
suggests the testator's failure to comply was the result of mistake or ignorance.42
Although both the Restatement and the UPC favor this alternative to the conventional
law,4 fewer than a quarter of the states have adopted some form of the harmless error
rule."
B. Policy
The conventional law of will-authentication and the reform movement's
harmless error proposal can be evaluated from a policy perspective with the
economic tool of decision theory.45 Decision theory provides a framework for
identifying the optimal decision-making process for a given determination,' such as
whether a particular document is an authentic expression of the testator's intent.47 To
begin with, decision theory suggests that accuracy is one factor in selecting the
process that courts should use to authenticate wills" Because the law's ultimate goal
is to carry out the testator's intent, 4 the extent to which the law correctly
distinguishes authentic wills from inauthentic wills is naturally an important
consideration for policymakers.so In the context of a binary decision, like whether a
document is or is not the testator's authentic will, decision theory suggests that the
accuracy of a decision-making process should be evaluated by considering two types
a See Langbein, supra note 38, at 4-5 (arguing that, under the harmless error rule, "proponents of a
defectively executed will should be allowed to prove what they are now entitled to presume in cases of
due execution-that the will expresses the decedent's testamentary intent").
4 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS. OF UNIF. STATE LAWS
2010); RESTATEMENr (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (AM. LAW
INST. 1999).
4 See DUKEMINIER & SrrKOFF, supra note 2, at 184.
4s See generally C. Frederick Beckner IIH & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory andAntitrust Rules,
67 ANITrRUST L.J. 41 (1999) (describing and applying decision theory).
* See id at 41-42 ("Decision theory sets out a process for making factual determinations and
decisions when information is costly and therefore imperfect. It formulates a methodology for determining
when to make decisions on the basis of current information and when to gather and consider further
information before making a decision."); Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, 7ing Law andPolicy: A
Decision-TheoreticApproach, 69 ANrrrRUST U. 469,498 (2001) ("Docision theory provides a powerful
framework for understanding situations in which choices among alternative actions must be based on
imperfect information. It helps us understand the tradeoffs between, in effect, convicting the innocent and
absolving the guilty."); John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Facfmding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv.
1065, 1065 (1968) ("[T]he typical decision-theory problem involves the proper course of action to be
taken by a decisionmaker who may gain or lose by taking action upon uncertain data that inconclusively
support or discredit differing hypotheses about the state ofthe real but nonetheless unknowable world.").
' For my prior scholarship that applies decision theory to the issue of will-authentication, see
generally Glover, supranote 5 (focusing on the rate of error) and Glover, supranote 28 (focusing on error
costs).
a To be more precise, decision theory focuses on minimizing expected error costs-the product of
the likelihood of an erroneous decision and the cost of that erroneous decision-and makes accuracy a
primary consideration in the effort to minimize expected error costs. See Glover, supra note 28, at 619-20.
" See supranotes 17-19 and accompanying text
m See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt.
c (AM. LAW INsT. 2003) (explaining that the law seeks to "establish[] rules under which sufficiently
reliable determinations can be made regarding the content of the donor's intention.").
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of inaccurate determinations." One is a false-positive outcome, and the other is a
false-negative outcome.s2
A false-positive outcome occurs when the court decides that a purported will is
authentic when in reality it is inauthentic." Conversely, a false-negative outcome
occurs when the probate court decides that a truly authentic will is inauthentic. 5 Both
false-positive and false-negative outcomes result in erroneous decisions regarding a
will's authenticity, and therefore both undermine the testator's intent." As Professor
Robert Sitkoff explains: "Both kinds of error dishonor the decedent's freedom of
disposition. The former gives effect to a false expression of testamentary intent; the
latter denies effect to a true expression of testamentary intent.""6 The failure to give
effect to the testator's intent in the ways that Sitkoff describes represents the costs of
erroneous will-authentication decisions." Because the law's primary goal is to fulfill
the testator's intent," policymakers should strive to minimize these error costs
by selecting an accurate will-authentication process." The most accurate
will-authentication process is the one that reduces the combined risk of allowing
probate of inauthentic wills and denying probate of authentic wills.'
Although accuracy, and therefore error cost minimization, is an important
consideration for policymakers in crafting a will-authentication process, they must
also consider the costs associated with making accurate will-authentication
decisions." The court's task of determining the testator's intent, including the
authenticity of a will, entails costs in the form of time, money, and effort expended
by the litigants and the courts as they present and consider evidence relating to the
testator's intent."2 Decision theory refers to these types of costs as decision costs,'
and Professor Adam Samaha explains that these costs include "any burden, such as
resource expenditure or opportunity costs, associated with reaching a decision,"

s' See Hylton & Salinger, supra note 46, at 499.
n Id at 499 n.116. False-positive outcomes are sometimes referred to as Type I errors, and
false-negative outcomes are sometimes referred to as Type II errors. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L REv. 1477,1504 (1999).
3 See DUKEMINIER & SrIKOFF, suipm note 2, at 153; Kelly, supra note 9, at 880; Sitkoff, supra note
14, at 647.
* See sources cited supra note 53.
Glover, supra note 28, at 629-31.
G
* Sitkofl supra note 14, at 647.
* A description of the error costs associated with both false-positive outcomes and false-negative
outcomes is not as simple as Sitkoff suggests. However, he is correct that both types of false outcomes
undermine the testator's intent, and that the two types of error generate roughly equivalent costs under
modern conditions. See Glover, supra note 28, at 630-33, 646-47.
*See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
* See generally Glover, supra note 5.
mSee Glover, supra note 28, at 619-20.
61
See id at 620-21.
' See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
6 See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74,111 (2000) ("Decision costs' is
a broad rubric that might encompass direct (out-of-pocket) costs of litigation to litigants and the judicial
bureaucracy, including the costs of supplying judges with information needed to decide the case at hand
and formulate doctrines to govern future cases; the opportunity costs of litigation to litigants and judges
(that is, the time spent on a case that could be spent on other cases); and the costs to lower courts of
implementing and applying doctrines developed at higher levels.").
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including "time, money, and emotional distress from uncertainty, conflict, worry,
and the like."

Decision theory suggests that policymakers should select the process for making
will-authentication decisions that minimizes the sum of both error and decision
costs. 6 1 Under this framework, if a change to the process by which courts authenticate
wills would drastically increase decision costs but would only incrementally increase
the process's accuracy, and in turn only minimally reduce error costs, then
policymakers should not make the change. However, if a change would dramatically
increase the process's accuracy, and in turn significantly decrease error costs, but
such a change would only minimally increase decision costs, then policymakers
should institute the change. In economic terms, the former reform should not be
adopted because its marginal cost exceeds its marginal benefit, and the later reform
should be adopted because its marginal benefit exceeds its marginal cost." By
focusing on the net effect of reform in this way, decision theory can aid policymakers
in evaluating the ways in which courts authenticate wills.
When viewed through the lens of decision theory, the conventional law of
will-authentication can be seen as minimizing the risk of fiase-positive outcomes
because the process rarely results in the probate of an inauthentic will. 6 As explained
previously, few testators would leave behind a formally compliant document without
intending it to constitute a legally effective will.68 Consequently, the court can
presume that a formally compliant will is authenticated and be assured that its
authenticity decision runs a low risk of producing a false-positive outcome.
Decision theory, however, directs us to consider the possibility not only of
false-positive outcomes but also of false-negative outcomes.6 ' When both types of
error are considered, the conventional law seems to produce a significant risk of
false-negative outcomes.'o In particular, it runs the risk of invalidating authentic wills
when the testator fails to strictly comply with the prescribed formalities due to.
mistake or ignorance of the law. Because the rule of strict compliance prohibits the
court from validating a noncompliant will despite overwhelming evidence of its
6 Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 616 (2006) (emphasis omitted)
(explaining further that these costs "reach[] everyone who bears these costs, whether public or private
actors"); see also Beckner & Salop, supra note 45, at 44 ("In making these determinations, the court must
be mindful of the financial, time, and management costs that it is inflicting on the parties (including third
parties) and itself.").
' See Beckner & Salop supra note 45, at 46 ("A rational decision maker will try to minimize the sum
of the two types of costs. This is the second key insight of the decision theoretic approach." (footnote
omitted)); Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Courtand the Lmuits ofAntitrust, 52 B.C. L. REv. 871, 879
(2011) ("[D]ecision theory's instruction [is] to craft legal rules so as to minimize the sum ofdocision and
error costs.").
* See Wendel, supra note 7, at 384-85 ("An economic analysis focuses on marginal costs and
benefits. Whether one should enter into a proposed transaction, or adopt a proposed law, depends on
whether the marginal benefits ofthe proposed transaction or law exceed the marginal costs ofthe proposed
transaction or law. The proposed transaction/law is efficient if the marginal benefits exceed the marginal
costs." (footnotes omitted)).
67
Glover, sqpra note 5, at 363.
"See supranotes 31-35 and accompanying text.
* See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
nGlover, supra note 5, at 363.
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authenticity,' doubts arise regarding whether the conventional law represents the
most accurate method of will-authentication. Critics argue that the conventional law
is overly concerned with protecting against false-positive outcomes and that it
produces too many false-negative outcomes. 72 They argue further that the risk of
false-negative outcomes can be reduced without a significant increase in the risk of
false-positive outcomes and that, therefore, the overall process ofwill-authentication
can be made more accurate.
Specifically, critics of the conventional law argue that the harmless error rule
allows the court to avoid the obvious false-negative outcomes produced by the rule
of strict compliance.7 4 It does so by granting the court the discretion to validate a
noncompliant will when there is strong evidence that it is truly authentic. Although
the flexibility that the harmless error rule gives courts likely reduces the risk of
false-negative outcomes, it might increase the risk of false-positive outcomes. While
exercising this discretion, the court might incorrectly assess the extrinsic evidence of
the will's authenticity and validate a will that the testator did not intend to be legally
effective." If the harmless error rule's reduction of filse-negative outcomes is
accompanied by an increase in false-positive outcomes, then reform would not
necessarily make the process more accurate. Although the possibility of an increased
rate of false-positive outcomes should be considered, this concern has not emerged
as a significant critique of the harmless error rule.
Recognition that the harmless error rule might lead to more accurate
will-authentication decisions, however, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that reform is needed.7 6 As explained above, decision theory suggests that accuracy
should not be the sole goal of will-authentication methods." Instead, the benefit of
accurate decisions must be considered alongside the cost of making accurate
decisions.7 The optimal method of will-authentication minimizes the total cost of
the process, which includes both the error costs ofmaking inaccurate determinations
of authenticity and the decision costs associated with making determinations of
authenticity.7 9
71

.

See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 9, at 880 ("Currently, the concern about [false-negative outcomes]
may be greater than the concern about [false-positive outcomes.] Most disputes over execution
at least based on reported decisions, seem to involve technical defects or obvious
formalities .
mistakes..
' See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 38, at 52 (suggesting that under the harmless error rule "the estates
of those who have committed innocuous execution errors are now being distributed in accordance with
their wishes," and that "[tihe intent-serving goal ofthe Wills Act is achieved better without than with the
rule of strict compliance.").
' See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 9, at 889 ("The harmless error rule may decrease ... false
negatives ... as a court is authorized to excuse an execution defect ifthere is clear and convincing evidence
the testator intended the document or writing to be a will.").
" See id ("[The harmless error rule still entails the possibility of error costs; courts, operating with
imperfect information, may not apply harmless error correctly or uniformly in every case.").
' See generally Wendel, supra note 7 (arguing that "flexible strict compliance" is a more efficient
approach than harmless error).
"See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
* See Beckner & Salop, supra note 45, at 46.
* See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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While the conventional law of will-authentication may not be the most accurate,
it might minimize the costs of making authenticity decisions." Under the
conventional law, the issue of whether the testator truly intended a will to be legally
effective is decided by evaluating the testator's compliance with the prescribed
formalities." If the testator complied, the court determines that she intended that the
will be legally effective, and if she did not, the court determines that she did not
intend the will be legally effective. By focusing solely on formal compliance rather
than on the underlying issue of intent, the conventional law provides the probate
court with a relatively easy process for making authenticity decisions.' The court
does not have to make individualized determinations of the testator's intent based
upon all available evidence," and consequently the cost of related litigation is
generally avoided."
But again, just because the conventional law minimizes decision costs does not
mean that it is the optimal method of will-authentication. Instead of focusing solely
on the minimization of decision costs, policymakers should consider whether the
saved cost of making authenticity decisions outweighs the foregone benefit of
making more accurate decisions. Therefore, to make a persuasive argument for
reform, critics of the conventional law must establish not simply that an alternative
method of will-authentication would be more accurate, but that its increased
accuracy does not produce an even greater increase in decision costs.
In this regard, the main critique of the harmless error rule focuses on the
possibility of increased decision costs." Indeed, the primary concern is that the
discretion the harmless error rule grants courts to validate noncompliant wills leads
to more expensive and frequent litigation regarding the authenticity of wills.' With

aSee Wendel, supra note 7, at 382 ("[I]t seems rather obvious that one of the important public policy
considerations served by the Wills Act is to help control the costs of administration associated with
ascrtaining and giving offect to testator's intent").
* See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text
a Langbein, supra note 22, at 494 (explaining that because will formalities produce uniformity,
"[c]ourts arc seldom left to puzzle whether the document was meant to be a will" and explaining further
that "[t]ho court can process [the testator's]estate routinely, because his testament is conventionally and
unmistakably express and evidenced."); see also Hirsch, supra note 7, at 296 ("By calling on courts to
judge a testator's volitional state of mind, we would impose courts an evidentiary burden that raises their
decision costs. By barring such evidence, we would lesson those costs.").
" See Glover, supra note 23, at 629-30.
4 See Adam J. Hirsch, FormalizingGratuitousand ContractualTransfers:A SituationalTheory, 91
WASH. U. L REv. 797, 804 (2014) ("In economic terms ... we can justify the imposition of expensive
formalities on parties as functioning to avoid spillover costs-internalizing the negative externality
created by the state-supported construction proceedings for transfers formulated in ambiguous ways.");
David Horton, Tomorrow's Inheritance: The Frontiers of Estate Planning Formalism, 58 B.C. L. REv.
539, 577 (2017) ("[TJhe need to prevent spillover costs-not the desire to carry out the decedent's
intent-furnishes the most forceful reasons to take the Wills Act at its letter.").
' See Horton, supra note 84, at 574 ("[C]oncem about the burden on the judicial system has also
surfaced during the debate over the harmless error rule. Scholars have voiced concern that replacing strict
compliance with harmless error may increase litigation rates by providing new ammunition to
disappointed heirs."); Kelly, supra note 9, at 881 ("Regarding decision costs, one concern with harmless
error ... is that [it] might increase litigation costs .... ").
' Hirsch, supra note 84, at 829 ("The harmless error power might tend to encourage carelessness and
breed litigation . . .."); Kelly, supra note 9, at 889 ("The harmless error rule could increase decision costs,
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the discretion to validate noncompliant wills, the authentication process is more
difficult. The court is not tasked with simply evaluating formal compliance in all
cases, but in some cases it is tasked with evaluating the more complex issue of
intent." When addressing this more complex issue, the court and the litigants in a
particular case might have to devote more time and effort in presenting and
evaluating the evidence regarding the underlying issue of intent."
Moreover, the number of cases in which a will's authenticity can be judged
simply by formal compliance could decrease." Because a noncompliant will is no
longer necessarily invalid, testators may have less incentive to strictly comply with
execution formalities. The number of compliant wills might consequently decrease,
and the number of noncompliant wills might increase. The harmless error rule could
therefore produce greater decisions costs not only by allowing authenticity to be
decided through a more cumbersome process, but also by reducing the number of
wills that can be authenticated through the easier process of evaluating formal
compliance.
Proponents ofreform counter these arguments regarding the harmless error rule's
potential to increase decision costs in two primary ways. The first is that the
conventional law's rule of strict compliance does not necessarily provide courts a
simple, straightforward process for authenticating wills. Proponents of reform argue
that instead of litigation regarding the true issue of intent, the conventional law
produces litigation regarding formal compliance.90 By turning the court's attention
squarely to intent, the harmless error rule does not necessarily substitute a
straightforward authentication process with a contentious process; it simply replaces
one type of litigation with another." As such, proponents of reform argue that any
given case will not be more difficult to decide under either the harmless error or strict
compliance rule.

either because the rule might result in more litigation or because any litigation that does occur might
involve factual or legal questions that are more difficult to determine.").
87See Horton, sqpra note 84, at 574 ("Once the crystalline statutory elements have been replaced with
a muddy standard, however, all mainer of malformed instruments may come out of the woodwork.").
' See John V. Orth, Wills Act Formalities:How Much Compliance Is Enough?, 43 REAL PROP.,

TRUST & EST. LJ. 73, 80 (2008) (arguing that under the harmless error rule the "incluctable problem
remains of determining the intention of a person now dead, particularly in light of often conflicting
evidence offered by persons with an interest in the outcome.").
' See Kelly, supra note 9, at 878.
9 See Langbein, supra note 22, at 525 ("Many ofthe formalities have produced a vast, contradictory,
unpredictable and sometimes dishonest case law in which the courts purport to find literal compliance in
cases which in fact instance defective compliance."); Langbein, supra note 38, at 28 ("[TJhe rule of strict
compliance may actually promote litigation, by inciting courts to bend the ostensible rules in ways that
make the outcomes hard to predict."); James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirementfor Wills,

68 N.C. L. REv. 541, 572 (1990) ("Courts . . . often decide like cases dissimilarly because some courts
will strain to avoid the unduly harsh rules for formal validity. Thus, even where the case or statutory law
seems to be clear, disappointed beneficiaries will still litigate to try to win their devises.").
" See Langbein, supra note 22, at 526 ("'The choice is not between litigation and no litigation. In
cases of defective compliance the important choice is between litigation resolved purposefully and
honestly under the [harmless error rule], or irrationally and sometimes dishonestly under the rule of literal
compliance."); Lindgrcn, supra note 7, at 1016 (arguing that under the harmless error rule "[1]itigation
about formalities will lessen; litigation about testamentary intent will increase.").
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The second argument that proponents of reform make is that, by granting courts
discretion to authenticate noncompliant wills, the harmless error rule does not
necessarily reduce the testator's incentive to strictly comply with the prescribed
formalities.' The total number of cases in which a will's authenticity can be
determined solely by the testator's formal compliance may not decrease.' The
incentive to formally comply would remain intact because the testator would still
reap a substantial benefit by complying. A testator likely does not want to place her
estate in litigation and face the risk that the court will invalidate her will. As such,
even if the court has discretion to excuse harmless errors, the testator would still have
strong incentive to comply in order to avoid placing the court in the position to
exercise that discretion.'
Thus, the extent to which the harmless error rule increases decision costs, and in
turn whether it generates an overall net benefit, is an ongoing debate, and as the
preceding discussion illustrates, decision theory is a useful tool for analyzing these
issues. At its core, decision theory suggests that policymakers should maximize the
overall benefit produced by the will-authentication process. When evaluating various
methods of will-authentication and the overall benefit that they produce,
policymakers should consider how accurately a particular method authenticates
wills." Moreover, it directs policymakers to also consider the decision costs that the
method of will-authentication produces.' After weighing the costs and benefits of
potential will-authentication methods, policymakers should select the option that
produces the overall net benefit.'
While decision theory nicely frames the discussion regarding the appropriate
method of will-authentication, policymakers should not lose sight of the law's
ultimate goal. The primary objective of the law of wills is not simply to correctly
distinguish authentic wills from inauthentic wills. Instead, the law's goal is to
distribute the testator's property according to her wishes." Making accurate and
efficient decisions regarding a will's authenticity is the first step in the pursuit of this
goal, but the entire process of fulfilling the testator's intent must be considered when
prescribing the method used to make the initial authenticity decision. In this regard,
one must consider that after the court authenticates a will, the court must interpret
it." Generally, the court attributes the plain meaning to the will's words," and the

' See Sherwin, supra note 36, at 469 ("A testator suffiicently informed to know of the will statutes
has powerful reasons to follow them, whether or not courts have authority to accept defective wills.").
9 See Langbein, supra note 38, at 51-52 (suggesting that the harmless error rule "has [not] inspired
testators to become sloppy about executing their wills" and consequently "the reform has Ict unaffected
the estates of tcstators who have complied fully with the Wills Act formalities").
"Id at 52 (explaining that "people do not set out to embroil their estates in litigation").
"See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text
"See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text
"See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
"See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text
"See Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 650.
'0 DUKEMINiBR & SiTKOFF, supra note 2, at 328 (explaining that under the plain meaning rule, "the
plain meaning of the words of a will cannot be disturbed by evidence that the testator intended another
meaning.").
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testator's estate is then distributed as expressed by the will's terms.'o' Ifthe will does
not accurately express the testator's actual intent, then the law's ultimate goal will
not be achieved, even if the court makes a correct determination regarding the will's
authenticity.
With this in mind, this article's first primary argument is that, when crafting the
method by which courts authenticate wills, policymakers should consider not only
the error costs associated with incorrect will-authentication decisions and the
decision costs of the process, but also the expected benefit of probating the testator's
will. Put differently, policymakers should consider the extent to which the testator's
intent will be fulfilled if a correct determination of authenticity is made. On the one
hand, if the testator's will accurately expresses her actual intent, then the benefit of
honoring the testator's intent will be realized by authenticating her will. On the other
hand, if the testator's expressed intent, as found in her will, does not significantly
match her actual intent, then little benefit will be reaped by making a correct decision
regarding the will's authenticity.
The consideration of a will's expected benefit bears directly on the decisions
costs policymakers should tolerate in a will-authentication process. If a will's
expected benefit is high because it accurately reflects the testator's actual intent, then
policymakers should tolerate greater decision costs. More time, effort, and money
should be expended so that this higher benefit is realized. By contrast, if a will's
expected benefit is low because the intent expressed therein likely does not reflect
the testator's actual intent, then policymakers should not tolerate significant decision
costs. In such a situation, a correct decision regarding the will's authenticity will not
lead to the fulfillment of the testator's intent regarding the ultimate disposition of her
property.
In sum, to obtain a complete picture of the costs and benefits of a
will-authentication process, policymakers must consider the expected benefit of
wills. Only by doing so can they fully assess whether the conventional law or the
reform movement's harmless error proposal produces a greater net benefit. The
role that a will's expected benefit should play in selecting a method of
will-authentication, however, has been absent from the debate; consequently, a
complete evaluation of the optimal method of will-authentication has not occurred.
H. THE EXPECTED BENEFIT OF WILLS

The recognition that the expected benefit of wills should inform how the law
authenticates them raises the question of how policymakers can gauge the expected
benefit of wills. A will's expected benefit is a product of the likelihood that the will's
terms match the testator's actual intent.m If the testator's intent as expressed in her
will substantially aligns with her actual intent at death, then the will has a high
expected benefit. Conversely, if the testator's expressed intent only minimally
matches her actual intent, then the expected benefit is relatively low.
1o. Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 650 ("The testator's estate must be distributed in acconiance with the
terms of the will.").

"nSee supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text
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Of course, the difficulty with deciphering the testator's intent at probate stems
from the court's inability to obtain evidence of her intent though direct testimony.' 03
Thus, the court cannot simply ask the testator whether her will accurately expresses
her actual intent any more than it can ask her whether her will is authentic. To address
this evidentiary problem, the article's second primary argument is that the timing of
testation can provide evidence of the likelihood that a will accurately conveys the
testator's intended estate plan.
Consider a hypothetical testator who executes a will during the prime of her life
and then dies from a sudden illness two years later. This testator's will likely reflects
her intent at the moment of her death. Put differently, if immediately before her
death, the testator were asked how she would prefer her estate to be distributed, her
response would probably have closely matched how her will provided for the
disposition of her property. This likely similarity between the estate plan that this
hypothetical testator would have described immediately before death and the one
expressed in the will that she executed two years prior flows from two
considerations.
First, the will likely reflects the testator's intent at the time she executed it.
Because the testator executed her will while she was free from the infirmities of old
age and ill health, she was not an attractive target for overreaching by wrongdoers
attempting to improperly influence her estate plan."' As such, her will likely reflects
her intent rather than the intent of someone else. Second, the testator's intent likely
did not significantly change in the intervening period between will-execution and
death.ios Because only two years separated the creation of the will and its
effectiveness, little opportunity existed for circumstances to arise in the testator's life
that would cause her intended estate plan to change.'" Thus, the timing of this
testator's act of executing a will suggests that the will accurately describes her
intended estate plan at death.
It however, this hypothetical testator had executed her will earlier, for instance
twenty years prior to her sudden demise 07 there would be greater opportunity for
changing circumstances to render her will stale, and the likelihood that her will
reflects her intended estate plan would be diminished. Conversely, if she had
executed her will later, perhaps in the hospital, hours before death, " she would have
been more susceptible to overreaching, which would likewise diminish the
likelihood that the will accurately reflects her actual intent at death. Of course, for
'o3 See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 287 ("The mind of a testator teems with data, but data that is difficult
to access, and assess, without risk of inaccuracy or misrepresentation. Death compounds those risks.");
Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 647 ("A will is a peculiar legal instrument. . . in that it does not take effect until
after the testator dies. As a consequence, probate courts follow what has been called a 'worst evidence'
rule of procedure. The witness who is best able to [provide evidence of intent] is dead by the time the
court considers such issues." (footnote omitted)).
"See infra Sedion H.B.
0
' 3 See infra Section H.A.
ie See infra Section II.A.
' See, e.g., Friedman v. Hannan, 987 A.2d 60, 63 & n.3 (Md. 2010) (involving a testator who
executed a will on April 18, 1986 and died on September 10, 2006).
" See, e.g., Daley v. Boroughs, 835 S.W.2d 858, 860-61 (Ark. 1992) (involving a testator who died
seven hours after amending his will while in the hospital).
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any individual testator, circumstances can change dramatically on the day after a will
is executed and overreaching can occur well before death. However, on average,
across all testators, the timing of testation relative to the testator's death affects the
likelihood that a will accurately memorializes the testator's intended estate plan.
A. Early Testation
When testation occurs early in life, questions arise regarding whether a will
represents the testator's intent at death. These questions arise because a long period
of time can separate the execution of a will and the testator's death. A testator can
draft and execute a will at any point in her adult life,'" and the document that she
produces will reflect her intent at that moment. 0 Indeed, the testator crafts her estate
plan based upon her known circumstances, including the relationships that she enjoys
with friends and family and the property that she owns at that point in her life.'
A will takes effect, however, not at the time the testator executes it, but at the
time that the testator dies.I 2 The time between will-execution and death might be
minimal, but it need not be so. To the contrary, a testator can execute a wrn and
survive for decades afterward,"' and in the intervening years, much can happen that
can change the testator's intent regarding the disposition of her estate."' The
testator's relationships with potential beneficiaries can change over time. Likewise,
the nature of the testator's property can change as she disposes and acquires property
during the ordinary course of her life."'
When circumstances surrounding the testator's relationships and property change
during the period between the execution of a will and the testator's death, uncertainty

m See sources cited supranote 3.
no This, of course, assumes no scrivener's errors.
' Although a testator might be able foresee the possibility of some changes occurring after the
execution of her will, she will not be able to foresee and account for all possible changes. See Daniel B.
Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Er PostJustfications,82 FORDHAM L REV.
1125, 1158-60 (2013).
"2 See John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff Torts andEstates: Remedying Wrongful Interference
With Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335, 342 (2013) ("The interest of a prospective beneficiary under a
will or will substitute does not ripen into a cognizable legal right until the donor's death. Until then, a
prospective beneficiary has a mere 'expectancy' that is subject to defeasance at the donor's whim.").
"3 See Hirsch, supra note 84, at 824 ("A transferor may preconceive a planned transfer-or an
inevitable one-and seek to formalize it long before the transferor intends it to become possessory.
Nowadays, of course, that is the standard practice for making a will. The transferor executes the will at an
early or middle age, anticipating by years or even decades the time when the transfer eventually, but
ineluctably, comes to fruition.").
114 See Sitkoff supra note 14, at 652 ("Another difficulty in construing wills stems from the gap in
time that intervenes between the making of a will and the testator's death. During this gap, which may
span years or even decades, circumstances can change in a way that renders the will stale or obsolete.").
" 5 See Mary Kay Lundwall, The Case Against the Ademption by Extinction Rule: A Proposalfor
Reform, 29 GoNz. L. REv. 105, 105 (1993) ("Because there is always some interval of time between the
execution of a will and the date when the will becomes effective at the testator's death, some bequests
mentioned in the will may have been sold, lost, damaged or destroyed. Since such property is no longer
in the testator's estate, it is clear that the devisee cannot receive the exact property. However, it is less
clear whether the devisee should be entitled to receive a substitute gift or its value." (footnote omitted)).
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arises regarding whether a will accurately reflects the testator's intent." 6 Professor
Adam Hirsch explains this uncertainty: "Wills drafted in the prime of life implicate
.. . the risk of being overtaken by events. If a hiatus separates the time when a will
is executed from the time when it matures ... changes in the testator's life[ ]may
render it less well adapted to his or her subsequent circumstances."" 7 One of the
implications of testation's timing is that the risk that Hirsch identifies is not the same
for all wills. Instead, as testation occurs earlier and earlier, this risk increases simply
because there is greater opportunity for intervening events to occur.
These intervening events can take on a variety of forms and can vary in the degree
to which they raise uncertainty regarding whether a will accurately expresses the
testator's intent at death. Under some scenarios, changed circumstances render the
testator's estate plan impossible to carry out."' Consider, for example, the death of
a beneficiary. A testator can execute a will that names specific beneficiaries whom
are to receive gifts upon her death, but, because a significant period of time can
separate the execution of a will and the testator's death, beneficiaries can predecease
the testator."' Deceased beneficiaries cannot be recipients of gifts, 2 o and
consequently the testator's estate plan, as expressed in her will, cannot be
achieved."' Of course, the testator can avoid this uncertainty by specifically
describing how she would like property distributed if a beneficiary dies before her
will becomes effective.'" Nevertheless, not all testators provide for such
contingencies; in such situations, uncertainty arises regarding whom the testator
intended to benefit from the gift that would have gone to predeceased beneficiaries.
In addition to the death of a beneficiary prior to the death of the testator, changes
that affect the testator's property can also lead to the impossibility of the testator's
estate plan. "2 Consider a situation in which the testator executes a will that purports
116 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 351 (explaining that "[civen if a will is
unambiguous" changed circumstances can suggest that "the testator's actual intent is not evident").
"7 Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L REV.
609, 611 (2009); see also RESrATEMENTr (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OrHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

ch. 5, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1999) ("There will always be some interval between the execution of a
will and the testator's death. The interval is sometimes long, sometimes short. Older wills, sometimes
called 'stale' wills, are just as valid as 'fresher' ones, but have the potential to do mischief if they are out
of date.").
" See Hirsch, supra note 117, at 624-25 ("[W]here the change is of a nature as to make the original
estate plan impossible to implement, some sort of intervention has to occur. Courts can do many things,
but they cannot do the impossible. Here they have no choice but to deviate from the strict letter of a
document's text").
9

See DUKEMINIER & SrrKOFF, supra note 2, at 351.
I2 RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OrrHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.2 cmt a (AM. LAW
"

INST. 1999) ("A donative transfer cannot be made to a deccased person. Because probate transfers take
place2at the decedent's death, they cannot be made to an individual who fails to survive the decedent").
1' See Hirsch, supra note 117, at 625 ("Impossibility in the context of wills arises ... where named
beneficiaries ... are no longer alive and hence are unavailable to accept bequests.").
2 See RESr. (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5 cmt g (AM. LAW INST.
1999) (explaining that "[a]n altemative devise indicates [the testator's] intent" regarding who should take
a predeccased bencficiary's gift and that the alternative devisee will take the predeceased bencficiary's
gift ifshe "survives the testator and is otherwise entitled to take (i.c., is not prevented from taking because
ofan unsatisfied condition").
'" See Hirsch, supra note 117, at 625 ("Impossibility in the context of wills arises ... where property
testators bequeathed no longer remains within their inventory of possessions . . . .").
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to give a specific piece of property to a specified beneficiary and then subsequently
sells the property that is the subject of the beneficiary's gift. The testator's expressed
intent is impossible to fulfill because she cannot give property that she no longer
owns.124 As such, uncertainty arises regarding what the testator intended the
beneficiary to receive-perhaps nothing; perhaps a different piece of property; or
perhaps the cash value of the original gift.
To address the impossibility of a testator's estate plan that occurs when a
beneficiary predeceases the testator or when the testator no longer owns property that
she purports to give in her will, the law applies rules of construction that are designed
to fulfill the testator's probable intent."' To be sure, these rules of construction fulfill
the actual intent of some, if not most, people.' 26 They will not, however, fulfill the
intent of all testators. The very fact that the law must resort to rules of construction
to address the issue of an impossible estate plan highlights the ambiguity of the
testator's intent and the resulting uncertainty regarding whether the testator's intent
is accurately expressed in her will.' 2 7
Although the uncertainty is perhaps most obvious in the case of an impossible
estate plan, changed circumstances need not render a testator's estate plan impossible
to raise doubts about whether a will accurately reflects the testator's true intent.12 8
Consider, for example, the situation in which the testator divorces after executing a
will that leaves a substantial gift to her former spouse.1 29 Consider also situations in
which the testator marries or has children after executing a will that leaves nothing
to these potential beneficiaries.' Under each scenario, uncertainty exists regarding
11 See id. (explaining that property testators dispose during life "is no longer theirs to give away" in
their wills at death).
i2 See DUKEMINIER& SrrKOFF, supranote 2, at 351 (explaining that "the rules that apply ifa named
beneficiary predoccascs the testator" and "the rules that deal with changes in the testator's property" both
address the stale will problem, and that "[i]n both circumstances, ifthe testator's intent is not evident, the
court will apply rules of construction that are meant to implement the probable intent of the typical
testator"). In the context of a predeceasing beneficiary, the rules of lapse, as altered by antilapse statutes,
attemptto fulfill the testator's probable intent See id at 357. In the case ofthe testator not owning property
that she purports to give through her will, the rules ofademption apply. See id at 373-74.
" To have a sense ofhow well these rules fulfill the probable intent ofthe testator, empirical evidence
would have to be collected; however, that endeavor has largely been ignored. See Hirsch, supra note 117,
at 656 ("[I]n every situation where theory warrants intervention to effectuate probable intent, we need
data to guide our course. Some data are available today, but we must have more. Without data to inform
our law, we are flying blind and cannot tell how far off target our hunches and conjectures are carrying
us.").
'" See Horton v. Ferris, 179 N.E.2d 680, 682 (Ill. 1962) ("The intention manifested in a will is
determined in two ways: (1) by ascertaining the actual meaning from the words used, to which rules of
construction give way, and (2) by finding the presumed intention from the application of rules of
construction governing all cases in which the meaning is obscured, doubtful or uncertain.").
12 See Hirsch, supranote 117, at 632 (explaining that "lawmakers have ventured out into the field of
speculation, amending an estate plan in discrete situations that vary from state to state" and that "[three
triggering events predominate: where the execution of a will is followed by divorce, by marriage, or by
childbirth.").
' See DUKEMINIER & SrrKOFF, supra note 2, at 239; see, e.g., Coffed v. Waley, 387 N.E.2d 1209,
1210 (N.Y. 1979).
1n See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 563, 566-67; see, e.g., Gray v. Gray, 947 So. 2d
1045, 1046 (Ala. 2006) (involving a child born after the execution of a will); In re Estate of Prestie, 138
P.3d 520, 521-22 (Nev. 2006) (involving a marriage that occurred after the execution of a will);.
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whether the will accurately reflects the testator's intent at death. As one California
Court of Appeals explains, "[Ulpon undergoing a fundamental change in family
composition such as marriage, divorce or birth of a child, [testators] would most
likely intend to provide for their new family members, and/or revoke prior provisions
for their ex-spouses."i'' The uncertainty in these scenarios stems from the conflict
between the unambiguous language of the testator's will, which suggests that the
testator possessed one intent, and the testator's circumstances at death, which suggest
that she held a contrary intent.
Divorces, marriages, and births that occur during the intervening gap between
will-execution and death raise so much doubt regarding whether a will accurately
reflects the testator's intent that the law presumes a will's unambiguous language no
longer expresses the testator's intended estate plan. Because a typical testator would
want to provide for a surviving spouse' 3 2 or child,'33 and conversely, because a
typical testator would not want to benefit an ex-spouse,' the law intervenes in these
situations and alters the estate plan expressed in the testator's will. Specifically, the
law presumes that the testator actually intended to give a portion of her estate to her
surviving spouse or children, despite that her will provides no benefit to these
beneficiaries. 3- Similarly, the law presumptively revokes a gift to the testator's
ex-spouse in a will that was executed prior to her divorce. " The rationale underlying
31

Coughlin v. Board ofAdmin., Pub. Emp. Ret Sys., 199 Cal. Rptr. 286, 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).

'3 UNIF. PROBATE CODE

§ 2-301

cmt (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS. OF UNIF. STATE LAWS

2010) ("This section reflects the view that the intestate share of the spouse ... is what the testator would
want the spouse to have if he or she had thought about the relationship of his or her old will to the new
situation.").
1 See Adam J. Hirsch, Airbrushed Heirs: The Problem of Children Omitted From Wills, 50 REAL
PROP. TR. & EST. LJ. 175,182-83 (2015) (explaining that the law "assum[cs] that [testators] would regret
not having acted more expeditiously to modify their estate plans" in reaction to "the subsequent
appearance of a child").
" See In re Estate of Rodriquez, 160 P.3d 679, 686 (Ariz. CL App. 2007) ("[R]cvocation by divorce
statutes rest on the belief that, after a divorce, neither spouse will usually with to leave any part of his or
her estate to the other.").
'3 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 563 (explaining that the law contains "rules
that . .. protect the surviving spouse and children from unintentional disinheritance by a stale will"). For
surviving spouses, this protection involves "giv[ing] a surviving spouse who is omitted from a premarital
will an intestate share, otherwise leaving the premarital will intact" Id Similarly, the protection for
surviving children involves a presumptive gift, but the precise amount can vary depending upon the
circumstances. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302. The presumption of gifts to a spouse who married the testator
after the execution ofa will, and to a child who was born after the execution ofa will, is rebuttable. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 9.6

cmt i (AM. LAW INST.

2003) ("Omitted-child statutes protect the testator's children . . . from unintentional disinheritance.
Consequently, such statutes yield to a contrary intent."); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 563
("The statutes contain default mules that can be overcome by evidence that the testator deliberately omitted
the surviving spouse").
"n RESTATEMENff (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 4.1(b)

(AM. LAW

INST. 1999) ("The dissolution of the testator's marriage is a change in circumstance that presumptively
revokes any provision in the testator's will in favor of his or her former spouse."); see also UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-804(b). The presumption of revocation of a gift to an ex-spouse is rebuttable. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 4.1(b) cmt

o (AM. LAW INST. 1999) ("The

Revised UPC provides that the presumption is rebutted if it is provided otherwise in the express terms of
the will, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the testator
and the former spouse before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment").
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both of these presumptions is that the occurrence of marriage, childbirth, or divorce
provides better evidence of the testator's true intent than the language of a will
executed prior to the event. 137
Marriages, divorces, births, and deaths are all examples of changed
circumstances that can occur between the execution of a will and the testator's death
that create uncertainty regarding whether a will accurately reflects the testator's
intent. As described above, the law intervenes in these situations with rules of
construction that alter the testator's estate plan to align with her probable intent.
These changes, such as revoking a gift to an ex-spouse or giving a gift to a child born
after the execution of a will, are intended to increase the likelihood that the probate
of a will fulfills the testator's intent. However, because these rules of construction
likely do not fulfill the intent of all testators, they do not eliminate the uncertainty
regarding whether a will's probate will carry out the testator's intent.
Marriages, divorces, births, and deaths are also the most easily identifiable
changes in the testator's life, as they are accompanied by formal evidence of the
change, such as a marriage license, divorce decree, birth certificate, or death
certificate. Furthermore, the uncertainty that these changes produce regarding the
testator's intent is obvious, as they render the testator's expressed intent either
impossible to fulfill or contrary to the probable intent of most people. Changed
circumstances, however, can be more difficult to recognize and can create less
obvious uncertainty regarding whether a will accurately expresses the testator's
intent.
Hirsch, for example, identifies a number of what he characterizes as "triggering
events" that can raise uncertainty regarding the testator's intent.'" These include
identifiable changes to the nature of the testator's relationships with potential
beneficiaries, such as an engagement to be married, a permanent separation from a
spouse, and the termination of a beneficiary's employment by the testator.' 39 Hirsch
also suggests that dramatic changes in the value of the testator's property from the
time of will-execution to the time of the testator's death could raise uncertainty
regarding the testator's intent.'" Like the previously discussed changed
circumstances, these potential triggering events are fairly easy to identify, and they
raise questions regarding whether the testator's will accurately reflects her intent at
death. The law, however, does not view the changes as creating enough uncertainty
to alter the testator's expressed estate plan.141

'3 See Hirsch, supra note 117, at 632 ("[L]awmakers simply reckon that these dramatic changes of
circumstance will likely precipitate a shift oftestamentary intent").
n Hirsch, supra note 117, at 643.
'39 Id at 643 n. 149. Hirsch identifies other potential triggering events as well, such as "[a] bencficiary
... harm[ing] the testator sufficiently to damage their relationship" and "a beneficiary's conviction of a
crime of moral turpitude." Id.
'" Id. Hirsch notes, however, that "[c]ourts have rejected claim of implied revocation on the ground
of substantial changes in the value of a testator's property." Id
"' See, e.g., Aten v. Tobias, 220 P. 196, 202 (Kan. 1923) ("Here there was an elevenfold increase in
the personal estate in seven years between making of the will and the death of the testator. But, because
of such unusual increase, the testator must necessarily have thought of the consequence to [the
beneficiaries], who according to this will would possess this handsome fortune, and also of the
consequences to [individuals omitted from the testator's will], who would possess none of it unless he
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Finally, some changes that occur over the testator's life can be so subtle that they
are not easily identifiable and, when taken individually, raise little uncertainty
regarding the testator's intent. For instance, the testator's affection for potential
beneficiaries undoubtedly waxes and wanes over time. 42 Given the fluid nature of
interpersonal relationships, it is difficult for the law to track the changes in the
testator's affinity for potential beneficiaries, let alone the degree to which the
testator's intended estate plan changes based upon these fluctuations. Similarly, the
relative need of potential beneficiaries might change in the time between
will-execution and death. Again, these changes are difficult for policymakers and
courts to identify,1 43 and they might not significantly affect the testator's intent. In
isolation, these incremental changes do not raise as much uncertainty as other
changed circumstances, such as marriages and divorces. But as the testator's
relationships with numerous potential beneficiaries change over time, these
incremental changes can render the testator's will increasingly obsolete.
In sum, the timing of testation is evidence of the degree to which a testator's will
becomes stale due to changed circumstances in the time between will-execution and
the testator's death. Some changes, such as marriage and divorce, raise so much
uncertainty regarding whether a will accurately reflects the testator's intent at death
that the law intervenes and alters the testator's expressed estate plan to conform with
her probable intent. The law's intervention in these circumstances does not eliminate
the uncertainty regarding whether the intent that is expressed in a will accurately
reflects the testator's actual intent at death, but it is designed to minimize this risk.
Other changes, in isolation, do not raise enough uncertainty to warrant the
application of rules of construction to change the testator's expressed estate plan.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the uncertainty that these more subtle changes
produce is not significant in the aggregate. To the contrary, as the length of time
between will-execution and death increases, the opportunity for changing
circumstances to accumulate over the course ofthe testator's life increases.' In turn,

bestirred himself to alter the testamentary disposition already made ofhis personalty. But the testator was
content to let it stand as made, and the court may not meddle with it."); see also Hirsch, supranote 117,
at 643 & n.149.

&

14 See In re Estate of Kottke, 6 P.3d 243, 248 (Alaska 2000) (recognizing that a testator's
"[r]clationships change over time, with relationships that were important at one time, sometimes fading").
" See Kelly, supra note 111, at 1136-37 ("[C]ompared to legislatures or courts, donors may possess
better information about the circumstances of family members and other donees.... Typically, courts
have neither the time nor the institutional capacity to investigate the circumstances of each decedent to
determine the optimal distribution.").
'"One important caveat regarding the implications of early testation is worth noting. Specifically,
early testation does not raise significant concerns for pour-over wills. In a pour-over will, the testator
gives the bulk of her estate to the trustee of a trust, which the testator establishes. See DUKEMINIBR
SITKOFF, supranote 2, at 463-64. The main dispositive provisions of the testator's estate plan are located
in the trust document and not in the will. See Reid Kress Weisbord & David Horton, Boilerplate and
Default Rules in Wills Law: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 103 IOWA L REv. 663, 686 (2018). As such, the
testator can execute a pour-over will long befbre death and continuously update her estate plan by
amending her trust rather than executing a new will. Early testation therefore does not necessarily have
the same implications for a pour-over will as it does for a will that is the testator's primary estate planning
document
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the likelihood that a will accurately represents the testator's intended estate plan at
death decreases, and consequently the will's expected benefit decreases as well.
B. Late Testation
Just as the degree to which a will accurately evidences the testator's intent
decreases if testation occurs too early, the same likelihood decreases if testation
occurs too late. Instead of this concern arising from the possibility of changed
circumstances during the period that intervenes the testator's execution of a will and
her death, it results from the testator's increased vulnerability. As Professor Peter
Wendel observes: "Time of death transfers, particularly those executed by elderly
testators, intuitively present an increased risk of fraud, duress, and/or undue
influence."' 4 5 As explained in greater detail below, fraud, duress, and undue
influence all involve a wrongdoer undermining the testator's freedom of disposition,
so that the estate plan described in a will reflects the wrongdoer's intent rather than
the testator's intent.' 4 6
Wendel's intuition that wills executed late in life pose a greater risk of being
tainted by overreaching than those executed earlier flows from the recognition that
testators who are near death may be suffering from mental infirmities and physical
4
weaknesses that render them less able to defend themselves from overreaching.i' A
testator who executes a will in the prime of life is likely to be fairly well-equipped
to detect and defuse a wrongdoer's attempt to subvert her intended estate plan."' By
contrast, the plights of old age or ill health can render the testator less able to defend
herself from attempts of wrongdoing." This increased vulnerability of a testator
who executes a will later in life makes her a more attractive target for potential
1
Consequently, when a testator executes a will too late, the likelihood
wrongdoers.'"
that the will accurately reflects the testator's actual intent decreases because the
testator is susceptible to an increased risk of overreaching.

1o Wendel, supra note 7, at 388-89. Hirsch labels transfers that occur close to death, "cleventh-hour
transfers." Hirsch, supranote 84, at 844-45.
"See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERs

§ 8.3 (AM.

LAW

INST. 2003).
14 See In re Metz' Estate, 100 N.W.2d 393, 398 (S.D. 1960) ("Obviously, an aged and infirm person
with impaired mental faculties would be more susceptible to influence than a mentally alert younger
person in good health."); Hirsch, supra note 84, at 846-49.
"n See Hirsch, supra note 84, at 810 ("These in good health with a strong will are, we might
say .. .'naturally protected.'").
"4 See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 352 ("Ttarning to the literature on lesser forms of pcrsuasion, one finds
that empirical evidence largely accords with judicial intuitions. Courts assume that the sick and the aged
are most susceptible to influence.") (footnote omitted); James H. Pietsch & Margaret Hall, "ElderLaw"
and Corficts ofInterest in the United States and Canada, 117 PENN ST. L. REv. 1191, 1196-97 (2013)
("[Ilt is indisputable that some people . .. take advantage of individuals who may not retain the ability to
protect themselves due to diminished mental or physical capacity and who may be more vulnerable due
to their reliance on others for their care.").
"nSeeMcKee v. McKee's Ex'r, 160 S.W. 261, 264 (Ky. App. 1913) ("Many persons wait until their
last days-even hours-to make wills; they are frequently then weak and debilitated. At such times they
are usually surrounded by persons who are interested in the disposition of their property. Under such
conditions opportunity for fraud or deception is frequently presented, and the incentive for its perpetration
is great").

2018--2019

245

THE TIMING OF TESTATION

The law's concern regarding the susceptibility of those nearing death and, in turn,
the increased risk that wrongdoers will replace the testator's intended estate plan
with their own is particularly evident in what are known as mortmain statutes.
Although they have now fallen out of favor,1 5 1mortmain statutes once limited the
extent to which religious organizations and other charities could benefit from a
will.' 52 These statutes originated from the fear that those close to death may be
particularly susceptible to influence or pressure, especially from religious groups.ss
As Professor Ray Madoff explains, "Mortmain statutes were ostensibly enacted to
address the concern that as people get closer to death, they may be inclined to direct
their estates to a religious or charitable organization to ensure their eternal
salvation."" Based on this rationale, some states specifically limited the application
of mortmain statutes to wills executed relatively late in life, such as those executed
six to twelve months before death.'ss In this way, mortmain statutes recognized that
late testation implicates an increased vulnerability of the testator and, as such, an
increased risk of overreaching by those attempting to undermine the testator's intent.
While testators nearing death may be particularly susceptible to influence from
those with religious authority or charitable auspices, the law is concerned with
protecting the vulnerable from any form of overreaching. As such, the modern law
of wills relies on a variety of doctrines to protect testators from all forms of
wrongdoing, regardless of the precise source of the overreaching.' 6 These include
the doctrines of undue influence, duress, and fraud, and each is designed to reduce

"' See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OrHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 9.7

cmt c

(AM. LAW INST. 2003) ("Allthe American mortmain statutes have been repealed, some after having been
held unconstitutional.").
'52 DUKEMINIER & SITKoFF, supra note 2, at 751; see also Shirley Norwood Jones, The Demise of
Mortmain in the UnitedStates, 12 Miss. C. L. REv. 407, 408-11 (1992).
' 53 DUKMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 751 ("'ese statutes originated in the medieval fear of
overreaching by priests taking the last confession and will."); Elizabeth R. Caster, Tipping the Scales in
Favor of CharitableBequests: A Critique, 34 PACE L REv. 983, 1013 (2014) ("The more common
concern ... was protecting testators and their families from overreaching by religious groups.").
'` Ray D. Madoff, What Leona Helmsley Can Teach Us About the Charitable Deduction, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 957,959 (2010); see alsoIn re Estate ofFrench, 365 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1976) ("Thc
purpose of the statute is to preclude 'deathbed' gifts to clergymen and religious organizations by persons
who might be unduly influenced by religious considerations.").
'. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 9.7

cmt b

(AM. LAW INST. 2003) ("Mortmain statutes in this country took either of two forms. One form
invalidated charitable devises in a will executed with a specified time before the testator's death. The other
form prohibited charitable devises that exceeded a specified portion of the testator's estate."); Kristine S.
Knaplund, Charityfor the "Death Tax": The Impact of Legislation on CharitableBequests, 45 GoNz. L.
REV. 713, 727 (2009) ("Some states required the will to be executed more than 30 days before death in
order to give effect to a bequest or devise to charity, thereby protecting the testator from any undue
influence on his or her deathbed; others went so far as to require its execution at least twelve months
before death.") (footnotes omitted)).
' See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 751 (explaining that "states once had statutes
permitting spouses and children to set aside deathbed wills making gifts to charity' but that "[t]oday
claims ofoverreaching by a charity, religious or otherwise, are litigated under the ordinary contest grounds
of undue influence, duress, or fraud").
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the risk that a wrongdoer will disrupt the distribution of the testator's estate in
accordance with her intent. 5 7
The doctrine of undue influence, for example, invalidates testamentary gifts that
were the product of suggestion or pressure that overcame the testator's free will.
If the testator could not freely exercise freedom of disposition because of another's
influence, her will, or at least portions of it, expresses the intent of the influencer
rather than her own.'" The difficulty with this doctrine is distinguishing persuasion
that overcomes the testator's free will from innocuous influence that leaves the
testator's free will intact.'" Because no clear demarcation between these two types
of influence exists, the law relies on various types of circumstantial evidence to guide
courts in identifying undue influence." Unsurprisingly, the court will consider the
testator's vulnerability to overreaching.' 62
The Restatement explains that courts should consider "the extent to which the
donor was in a weakened condition, physically, mentally, or both, and therefore
susceptible to undue influence.""' As explained above, the risk that the testator is
suffering from the vulnerabilities that the Restatement identifies as evidence of
potential undue influence increases as the testator approaches death. Thus, similar to
some mortmain statutes that expressly recognized that testation's timing relative to
death has implications for the potential of overreaching, the modem undue influence
doctrine also recognizes that testation's timing is a relevant consideration, albeit
implicitly through reference to the testator's vulnerability.
Like the doctrine of undue influence, the doctrines of duress and fraud are
designed to protect the testator from overreaching; however, they are distinct in that
that they protect the testator from different types of wrongdoing.'" Duress, for
instance, invalidates a will or specific gifts therein that were the product of
coercion. 161 Whereas undue influence involves mere persuasion that overcomes the
testator's free will, duress involves outright threats of physical or other types of
' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 (AM. LAW
INST. 2003).
" Id at § 83(b) ("A donative transfer is procured by undue influence if the wrongdoer exerted such
influence over the donor that it overcame the donor's free will and caused the donor to make a donative
transfer that the donor would not otherwise have made.").
" See In re Estate of Hoover, 615 N.E.2d 736, 741 (lil. 1993) (explaining that undue influence
involves "the substitution of one's will over that of the testator's original intent").
"o See DUKEMINIER & SrrKOFF, supra note 2, at 283 ("Drawing a line between indelicate but
permissible persuasion versus influence that is undue can be frustratingly difficult").
' See id ("[B]ecause direct evidence of undue influence is rare, a contestant must typically rely on
circumstantial evidence.").
'2 RSTATMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt e (AM.
LAW INST. 2003).
" Id. at cmt. h. Courts also recognize that the testator's vulnerability is circumstantial evidence that
should be considered. See, e.g., Bowman v. Bowman, 55 S.E.2d 298, 307 (Ga. 1949) ("[A]cts, conduct,
and circumstances may constitute undue influence when exercised on a person of failing mind, poor
health, and other mental and bodily enfeeblements which would not be such undue influence as to void a
will executed by a person of sound mind, good health, and intelligence." ).
6 See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 ants. e,
i, &j (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
6 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 313 ("When undue influence crosses the line into
coercion, it becomes duress.").
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harm." The doctrine of fraud, by contrast, is designed to protect the testator from
misrepresentations by the wrongdoer,i'6 rather than improper influence or coercion.
Despite these differences, wills that are the product of undue influence, duress, or
fraud, all include gifts that the testator would not have made had she exercised
freedom of disposition under her own free willi"s Furthermore, as the testator gets
closer to death, her susceptibility to all of these forms of overreaching increases.' 6 9
Thus, as evidenced by both historical and contemporary components of the law
of wills, late testation, like early testation, raises concerns regarding whether a will
accurately reflects the testator's intended estate plan. Two points regarding late
testation, which distinguish it from early testation, are worth noting. First, late
testation does not necessarily implicate an increased risk of vulnerability for all
testators. Many testators will die from old age or a protracted illness, and they likely
will experience increased susceptibility to overreaching due to decreased physical
and mental faculties. Some testators, by contrast, will die swiftly and unexpectedly,
and will not experience this increased vulnerability. Nonetheless, on the whole, the
risk of vulnerability to overreaching and consequently the risk that a will does not
accurately reflect the testator's intent increases as testation occurs closer to death.
The second point worth noting is that the risk of vulnerability likely increases
little until the testator gets very close to death at which point the risk may increase
exponentially. As Hirsch explains: "At the eleventh hour . . . the risk of fraud rises
by an order of magnitude; given the [testator's] infirmity" and "[b]y the same token,
when meeting with a dying [testator] in private, an ostensible donee can exercise
70
undue influence or duress without restraint."o
This rapid increase in risk of testator
vulnerability in situations involving late testation stands in contrast to the slower and
more regular increase in risk oftestamentary obsolescence that occurs when testation
occurs too early. As time marches on after the execution of a will, the opportunity
for the testator's circumstances to change increases steadily. Yet, despite this
difference in the rate at which risk increases as testation moves closer and farther
from death, both early testation and late testation implicate increased uncertaiity
regarding whether a will accurately expresses the testator's intent at death.

6 See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND Ori-R DONATIVE TRANsFERs § 8.3 cmt i
(AM. LAW INST. 2003) ("A donative transfer is procured by duress if the wrongdoer threatened to
perform or did perform a wrongful act that coerced the donor into making a donative transfer that the
donor would not otherwise have made. An act is wrongful if it is criminal or one that the wrongdoer had
no right to do.").
'6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OrHER DONATIVE TRANSFRs § 83(d) (AM.
LAW INST. 2003) ("A donative transfer is procured by fraud if the wrongdoer knowingly or recklessly
made a false representation to the donor about a material fact that was intended to and did lead the donor
to make a donative transfer that the donor would not otherwise have made.").
'"See id (explaining that undue influence, duress, and fraud each results in the testator making "a
donative transfer that [she] would not otherwise have made").
InSee
Hirsch, supra note 84, at 846-47; Wendel, supranote 7, at 389-90.
" Hirsch, supm note 84, at 846-47. Hirsch initially recognizes this increased risk in the context of
inter vivos gifts made near death, but he acknowledges the same concerns arise in the context of
testamentary gifts. See Id at 849 ("Both occur under the same conditions and . . . both raise the same
concerns."). Wendel recognizes the same point when he refers to "[t]ime of death transfers." See Wendel,
supm note 7, at 388-89.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

248

Vol. 107

In short, the time at which testation occurs relative to the testator's death can
provide insight into a will's expected benefit. When testation occurs too early, a
will's expected benefit is diminished because of the increased risk that changing
circumstances have rendered the will obsolete. 77 Likewise, when testation occurs
too late, a will's expected benefit is reduced because of the testator's increased
vulnerability to various forms of overreaching.'n By considering these implications
of testation's timing, policymakers can obtain a better sense of a will's expected
benefit. Moreover, because policymakers should consider the expected benefit of
wills while crafting the law, the timing of testation can also provide policymaker a
better sense of the decisions costs that should be tolerated in the process of
will-authentication.1 7 3

Ill. THE AGE OF WILLS
As Parts I and II argue, the timing of testation should play a role in the
development of the law of will-authentication. To make informed decisions
regarding potential reforms, however, policymakers need an understanding of when
testation actually occurs. In this regard, some scholars have made general
conclusions regarding testation's timing. For instance, Professor James
Lindgren explains: "Centuries ago many, if not most, wills were executed on the
deathbed. ... Yet today deathbed wills are rare."'7 I Similarly, in an earlier example,
Professor Ashbel Gulliver and Catherine Tilson suggested: "While there is little
direct evidence, it is a reasonable assumption that, in the period prior to the
[enactment of the] Statute of Frauds, wills were usually executed on the death
bed. . . . Under modern conditions, however, wills are probably executed by most
testators in the prime of life . . . ."
While these descriptions offer a general understanding of testation's timing, they
do not provide policymakers the information they need. Lindgren's observations are
largely based on anecdotal evidence, 7 6 and Gulliver and Tilson admit that their
observations are mere assumptions.'" Policymakers should rely on more than mere
anecdote or best guesses when crafting the law. Fortunately, empirical evidence of
when testation actually occurs is available. By surveying the probate archives from
various time periods, legal scholars have compiled data regarding testation's timing
that can be used to help shape the law. This data includes evidence of both historical
testation occurring in the period spanning the sixteenth and twentieth centuries and
contemporary testation occurring in the twenty-first.
..
n See supra Section II.A.
" See supra Section II.B.
'"See supra Section I.B.
17 Lindgren, supra note 90, at 554; see also Hirsch, supra note 84, at 848 ("In the Middle Ages,

testators typically made their wills as part of the last confession. Today, testators rarely wait until the
eleventh hour to execute their wills . . . ."(footnote ornitted)); Hirsch, supra note 117, at 610-11 ("Prior

to the nineteenth century, Americans and Britons typically put off executing their wills until death was
near... . Since the twentieth century, deathbed wills have grown comparatively rare.").
1 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 16, at 10.
'7 See Lindgren, supra note 90, at 554-56.

'"Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 16, at 10.
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A. Sbteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
As Lindgren's observations, as well as Gulliver and Tilson's, suggest, the general
consensus is that the conventional law ofwill-authentication developed during a time
in which testators frequently waited to the very end of life to execute their wills.17 8
Historian W. K. Jordan echoes this consensus: "The wills of [sixteenth and
seventeenth century England], were made in full contemplation of death, and they
were ordinarily drawn in the immediate presence of death. They were literally last
wills and testaments."'" Unlike others, however, Jordan supports this observation
with empirical evidence.
Specifically, in 1959, Jordan published a survey of sixteenth and
seventeen-century probate records of Canterbury, England, and in this survey he
reports data regarding the age of the wills in his sample.s0 Jordan does not provide
detailed information regarding the percentage of wills that were executed at various
time intervals before the testator's death, but instead, he simply reports the median
age of the wills in his sample, along with the age of the youngest and oldest wills.'si
Moreover, he provides these three data points for three time periods: (1.) 1504 to
1517; (2.) 1558 to 1564, and; (3.) 1617 to 1637.' The results of Jordan's study are
displayed in Figure I below.
Figure 1
CANTERBURY, ENGLAND
TIMING

1504-1517

1558-1564

1617-1637

Latest

6 Days

6 Days

3 Days

Median

59 Days

81 Days

121 Days

Earliest

2 Years,

3 Years,

7 Years,

2 Months,
I IDays

14 Days

6 Months,
I Day

Jordan's data supports his conclusion that testators once generally executed their
wills very close to death. Over half of the wills in Jordan's sample from 1504 to 1517
were executed within two months of the testator's death, and over half the wills from

" Professor John Langbein provides an explanation for this prevalence of late testation: "In the
seventeenth century when the first Wills Act was written, most wealth was in the form of realty, and
passed either by intestacy or conveyance. Will making could thus be left to the end . . . ." Langbein, supra
note 22, at 496-97.
'7 W. K. JORDAN, PHILANTHROPY IN ENGLAND 1480-1660 16 (1959).
1
See id at 17 n. 1.
n See id.
m1See id.
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1558 to 1564 were executed within three months before death.' Similarly, for the
years 1617 to 1637, the median age of the wills in Jordan's sample was roughly four
months.'" While the median age of these wills supports Jordan's general conclusion,
the age ofthe oldest wills bolsters it as well. Indeed, the data suggests testators rarely,
if ever, executed wills long before their deaths, as the oldest age in each of his three
sample intervals was roughly two years, three years, and seven and a half years. 8 s
Jordan's survey of sixteenth and seventeenth-century probate records from
Canterbury, England therefore suggests that the general consensus regarding
extremely late testation is correct. ia

B. Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
In addition to Jordan's study of sixteenth and seventeenth-century wills, several
scholars have conducted studies of testation that took place in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries."s' These studies give an historical perspective of testation's
timing in the period between the development of the conventional law and today.
They also provide context in which to interpret data regarding the timing of
contemporary testation.
i. Essex County, NJ - 1850, 1875, 1900
In 1964, Professor Lawrence Friedman published a study of 150 wills
probated in Essex County, New Jersey, an area that includes the City of Newark.' 88
Friedman's initial data set consisted of thirty wills from probate proceedings
commenced in 1850, sixty wills from probate proceeding commenced in 1875, and
sixty wills from probate proceeding commenced in 1900,' and for these individual
years Friedman sought to calculate each will's age. I I Because some of these wills
" In addition to information regarding the median age of wills in his samples, Jordan also provides
the average age. He reports that the average age of wills in the 1504 to 1517 sample was 106 days, and
that the average age in the 1558 to 1564 sample was 158 days. Id.
' Id Jordan reports that the average age for this sample was 273 days. Id
1 Id.
`6 In addition to Canterbury, Jordan also surveyed wills from York, and he reports that these
additional wills reveal similar information regarding the timing of testation. Id. ("Less extensive
samplings made of wills proved at York for these same years yielded substantially similar results.").
article focuses on four studies: MARVIN B. SUSSMAN, JuDrrH N. CATES & DAVID T. SMITH,
"'is
THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 66-68 (1970); Allison Dunham, The Method Process and Frequency of
Wealth 7)ansmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L REV. 241 (1963); Lawrence M. Friedman, Patterns of
Testation in the 19" Century: A Study of Essex County (New Jersey) Wills, 8 AM. J. LEGAL IST. 34
(1964), and; Kristine S. Knaplund, The Evolution of Women's Rights in Inheritance, 19 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 3 (2008).
" Friedman, supra note 187, at 34.
1 Id.
` Id at 37-38. For 1875 and 1900, it appears that Friedman compared the date of execution as found
on the will with the date of death as found in the probate records. A different calculation was used for
1850. As Friedman explains: "Date of death is not given for 1850 wills; the figures for 1850 refer to the
lapse of time between execution and probate, a somewhat longer period. This adds some slight distortion
to the figures." Id at 37 n. 11. Furthermore, Friedman explains that "[w]here there are codicils, the date of
the codicil is used instead of the date of the will." Id at 38 n.14.

2018-2019

251

THE TIMING OF TESTATION

were undated, Friedman excluded those wills from his analysis of testation's
timing,' 9' and consequently his final data set included twenty-eight wills from 1850,
fifty-eight wills from 1875, and fifty-seven wills from 1900.'" The results of
Freidman's study are summarized in Figure 2 below.t19
Figure 2
ESSEX COUNTY, NJ - 1850, 1875, 1900
NUMBER
TIMING

1 Month
or Less

1850
7

PERCENTAGE

16

1900
11

1850
25%

1875
27.6%

1900
19.3%

1875

I Month

9

21

18

32.1%

36.2%

31.6%

To I Year
I to 5 Years

8

13

18

28.6%

22.4%

31.6%

4

8

10

14.3%

13.8%

17.5%

More than 5
Years

Similar to Jordan's study,'" the most important takeaway from Friedman's
results is that a significant portion of wills were executed relatively late in life.
Indeed, Friedman begins by stating that "[n]ineteenth century wills were frequently
executed shortly before death." 9 s In particular, he reports that over a quarter of wills
from both 1850 and 1875 were executed within a month of death and that slightly
under a fifth of the 1900 wills were executed during this timeframe." When the
window is expanded to include all wills executed within one year of death, the
prevalence of late testation is even more striking, with 57.1% of 1850 wills, 63.8%
of 1875 wills, and 50.9% of 1900 wills executed in the last year of life.'" Moreover,
although he does not provide concrete data of extreme examples of late testation,
Friedman indicates that "in some cases the wills were executed one or two days
before death" and that "some of the wills must have been executed literally on the
testator's deathbed."' 9 8

Id at 38 n. 14. ("A few wills have boon omitted from the table because the will was undated.").
" These number were calculated by adding the number of wills founded in the four columns of
Freidman's table for each of 1850, 1875, and 1900. See id at 38 tbl.II.
' This table was compiled from the data contained in Friedman's Table II with the percentages
calculated by dividing the total number of wills for each year (as explained in the preceding footnote) by
the number of wills falling with in each column.
" See supra Section IllI.A.
1
Friedman, supra note 187, at 37.
' See id at 38.
" These percentages were calculated by adding the number of wills in the first two columns of
Friedman's Table II and dividing that number by the total number of wills in the data set for each year.
9 Id at 38.
'91
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This prevalence of late testation stands in stark contrast to the relatively low
rates of early testation that Friedman uncovered. Only 14.3% of 1850 wills, 13.80/
of 1875 wills, and 17.5% of 1900 wills were executed five or more years before
death.'9 Friedman does not break down his data of late testation into more discrete
intervals, 200 which might suggest that the instances of testation occurring
significantly later than five years before death were extremely rare or even
non-existent. In sum, Friedman's study reveals that testators in nineteenth century
New Jersey frequently executed their last wills late in life and rarely executed their
last wills early in life.
ii. Los Angeles County, CA - 1893

*

In 2008, Professor Kristine Knaplund published a study of the 1893 probate
archives of Los Angeles County, California, 201 which included the wills of 108
Knaplund does not describe precisely how she makes her
decedents. 2
calculations, 203 but she does report, at various intervals, the time at which these wills
were executed. Like Friedman, 20 ' she prefaces the discussion of her findings by
pointing out the prevalence of late testation, and although Knaplund begins by noting
5
that "[t]he majority of wills . . . were executed within a year of death,"2 this
observation does not adequately highlight the predominance of late testation that is
borne out in the details of the data that is summarized in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CA - 1893
TIMING

NuMBER

PERCENTAGE

3 Days or Less
4 to 30 Days
1 to 3 Months
3 to 12 Months
More than I Year

12
20
14
17
45

11.1%
18.5%
13%
15.7%
41.7%

'"See supra Figure 2.
m See Friedman,supra note 187, at 38 tbl.1.
m Knaptund, supra note 187, at 5-6.
Id at 6 (reporting the full sample of probate records consisted of 246 probate files, including "138
intestate decedents and 108 testate decedents").
T hle percentages that Knaplund reports were derived by using the entire 108 sample as the
denominator. See id at 19 ("'Thirty percent of the wills (32 of 108) were executed within thirty days of
death."). Howcver, elsewhere Knaplund reports that the date of execution for at least one will in her
sample was unknown. Id at 25 n.166 ("The will was not in the file so the date is unknown . . . ."). One
can assurne that Knaplund uses the date of a codicil rather than the date of the original will because she
reports that in one instance the will was not dated but the codicil was dated. See id at 29 n.180.
mSee Friedman,supranote 187, at 37.
2 Knaplund, supra note 187, at 18.
"'lle individual numbers and percentages for each interval were derived from the cumulative data
that Knaplund provides. See id. at 18-19.
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While Friedman only notes the occurrence of extremely late testation in
passing,2 Knaplund provides remarkable data regarding deathbed wills. She reports
that over one-tenth of the wills in her sample were executed within three days of the
testator's death.'" Beyond cases of extremely late testation, Knaplund's study
reveals that 29.6% of wills were executed within one month of death, 42.6% were
executed within three months of death, and 58.3% were executed within one year of
death. 2

With respect to early testation, Knaplund does not provide detailed information
other than that 41.7% of wills were executed more than one year before death. 210
Like Friedman's failure to provide data regarding testation occurring more than five
years before death, 21' Knaplund's failure to provide any information regarding
testation occurring more the one year before death might suggest that instances of
extremely early testation were rare. Given this limitation of Knaplund's data, it is
difficult to reach a conclusion regarding early testation in late nineteenth century Los
Angeles, but it is clear that late testation was prevalent.
iii. Cook County, IL - 1953, 1957
While Friedman and Knaplund analyzed nineteenth-century wills, Professor
Allison Dunham published a study of mid-twentieth century probate records-in
1963.212 Specifically, Dunham's study focused on the probate records of Cook
County, Illinois, which includes the Chicago metropolitan area, from the years 1953
and 1957.213 Dunham combined the wills from these two years to create a sample of
119 wills, 214 and he reported the time at which testation occurred relative to the
testator's death.2 15 Dunham's specific findings are summarized in Figure 4 below. 2 16

See Friedman, supra note 187, at 38.
nKnaplund, supra note 187, at 18.
"9 See id at 19.
21o See id
211

See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
supra note 187, at 241.
1 d. at 241-42.
214
Dunham does not clearly identify the total number of wills in his sample. At the beginning of his
study he notes that he sampled ninety-seven probate proceedings from 1953 and seventy-three from 1957.
Id at 241. The number of those 170 proceedings that involved wills is evident in a table in which Dunham
reports that fifty-one men and sixty-eight women in his sample died with wills. See id at 249. Dunham's
lack of clarity in this regard has caused confusion in past summaries of his findings. In particular,
Professors Marvin Sussman, Judith Cates, and David Smith crroneously suggest that Dunham's study
consisted of ninety-eight wills from 1953. See SussMAN, CATEs & SMrfH, supra note 187, at 66
(suggesting further that Dunham's study only included wills from 1953).
21
Dunham does not explain precisely how he calculated the timing of testation but did make clear
that he used the date of the last codicil. See Dunham, supra note 187, at 279 (reporting that "in only 2
cases in each of the years were codicils the reason for the freshness of the will").
2' The data in Figure 4 approximately mirrors the data in Dunham's Table 15. See id. The
differentiation, however, between wills that were executed six months or fewer before death and wills that
were executed six month to one years before death was derived from Dunham's statement that "almost
three-fourths of the wills less than one year old were executed within six months of death." Id.
212
213 Dunham,
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Figure 4
COOK COUNTY, IL - 1953, 1957
TIMING

NUMBER

PERCENTAGE

6 Months or Less
6 Months to I Year
1 to 3 Years
3 to 5 Years
5 to 10 Years
More than 10 Years

32
11
20
19
25
12

26.9%
9.2%
16.8%
16%
21%
10.1%

Like Friedman and Knaplund, Dunham suggests that the primary observation to
be gleaned from his study is "the freshness of the wills" in his sample.21 7 In other
words, the wills in Dunham's study were executed relatively late in the testator's life,
albeit not as frequently as the wills in either Friedman's or Knaplund's studies.218
Specifically, Dunham reports that approximately 26.9% of wills were executed
within six months of death and 36.1% were executed within the last year of the
testator's life. 219 Unlike Friedman and Knaplund, Dunham provides no information,
empirical or anecdotal, regarding extremely late testation, including deathbed wills.
In addition to his reporting regarding late testation, Dunham provides some data
regarding early testation. In particular, Dunham reports that approximately 30.3% of
wills were executed five or more years befbre the testator's death and that
approximately 10.1% of wills were executed more than ten years before death.220
Therefore, when compared to Friedman's and Knaplund's studies, Dunham's study
suggest a change in the timing of testation, with late testation slightly less prevalent
and early testation slightly more prevalent in the mid-twentieth century than in the
late nineteenth century.
iv. Cuyahoga County, OH - 1964, 1965
In 1970, Professors Marvin Sussman, Judith Cates, and David Smith published a
study of probate records from Cuyahoga County, Ohio, which includes the City of
Cleveland and its surrounding metropolitan area.221 Sussman, Cates, and Smith
surveyed 453 wills from probate proceedings commenced in a period spanning 1964
and 1965, and they reported the time that elapsed between the execution of these

217

1id.
218 See supra Subsedions III.B.i., III.B.ii.
219
See Dunham, supranote 187, at 279 (giving general infonnation that is calculated in percentages
in Figure 4 of this article); see also suprm Figure 4.
m See id; supra Figure 4.
2" SUSSMAN, CATES & SmiTH, supra note 187, at 36.
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The authors' findings are summarized in Figure 5

Figure 5
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OH - 1964,1965
TIMING

NuMBER

PERCENTAGE

3 Months or Less
3 to 6 Months
6 Months to I Year
1 to 3 Years
3 to 5 Years
5 to 10 Years
More than 10 Years

18
21
27
75
67
116
129

4%
4.6%
6%
16.6%
14.8%
25.6%
28.5%

In contrast to Friedman's, Knaplund's, and Dunham's observations regarding the
prevalence of late testation in their samples, Sussman, Cates, and Smith summarize
their findings by stating, "The testators in the decedent sample were early declarers
of property distribution."2 24 The authors report that only 4% of wills were executed
within three months of the testator's death, 8.6% were executed within six months
of death, and 14.6% were executed within one year of death. 225 Moreover, given the
small percentage of wills that were executed within three months of death, the
authors note that instances of extremely late testation in the form of deathbed wills
were probably rare. 2 26
Conversely, the authors report that a substantial percentage ofthe wills from their
sample were executed relatively early in the testator's life. Specifically, 54.1% of
wills were executed more than five years before the testator's death, and 28.5% were
executed more than ten years before death." This data, when coupled with data from
the previous three studies discussed in this section, suggests a trend away from late
testation and toward earlier testation from the nineteenth century into the
mid-twentieth century. This potential trend is evident in Figure 6 below."

mId at 62-66.
Figure 5 substantially mirrors the author's Table 4-3. See id at 66. However, the differentiation of
wills executed within three months, six months, and one year of death was derived from the authors'
statement that "39 wills (9 per cent) were made within six months of death; 18 (4 per cent) of the probated
wills were made within three months of death." Id at 66 n.13.
m SUSSMAN, CATEs & SMITH, supra note 187, at 66 (emphasis added).
2 See id at 66 & n.13; supra Figure 5.
m See SUSSMAN, CATs & SMITH, supra note 187, at 66 n.13 ("Possible deathbed wills were
infrequent . . . ."). Suggesting the presence of deathbed wills in this sample, Knaplund states that 4% of
the wills in Sussman, Cates, and Smith's study wore executed within 3 days of death. See Knaplund, supra
note 187, at 18 n.122. However, the authors clearly state that 4% were executed within three months of
death. See SussMAN Er AL, supra note 187, at 66 n.13.
m See SussMAN, CATES & SmrrH, spra note 187, at 66.
m This Figure was derived from the data discussed in Sections III.B.i., III.B.ii, III.B.iii., and III.B.iv.
One detail regarding this Figure is worth noting. Specifically, Knaplund did not provide specific data
regarding testation occurring more than five years before death. See Knaplund, supra note 187, at 18-19.
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Figure 6
FREQUENCY OF LATE & EARLY TESTATION
(1850-1965)

70

aLess
Than1

Year

60

50
40
30
20
10

0
1850 NJ

1875 NJ

1893 CA

1900 NJ

1950's IL 1960's OH

As Figure 6 illustrates, over half of the wills in the studies focusing on
nineteenth-century testation were executed within one year of the testator's death.

This figure dipped to slightly over one-third of wills in Dunham's study of 1950s
wills and then dropped again to under 15% of the wills in Sussman, Coats, and
Smith's study of 1960s wills. While the data suggests a dramatic decrease in the rate
of testation occurring less than one year before death, it also suggests a
corresponding increase in the rate of testation occurring more than five years before

death. Friedman reports that, in each of his three nineteenth century samples, less
than one-fifth of wills were executed more than five years before death. By
Dunham's 1950's study, this fraction had increased to almost one-third, and by
Sussman, Coats, and Smith's study of 1960s wills, the fraction of wills executed

more than five years before death had increased to over one-half.
Overall, the studies focusing on historical testation suggest that late testation
persisted well into the twentieth century and that, at some point in the middle of that
century, testators began executing wills earlier in life more often. Some of these
authors recognized this trend from their own data. For instance, Friedman hinted at
this trend when he states that "[o]n the basis of [his] evidence, it seems likely that
the number of wills made 'in contemplation of death' has been declining in the
United States,"a and Knaplund summarizes this shift nicely when she notes her
study's role in revealing "[tihe trend toward executing a will and then living
longer."23 0
As such, the Figure does not include a bar representing the percentage of testation occurring within this
window for the study labeled "1893 CA."
Friedman, supra note 187, at 37.
a Knaplund, supra note 187, at 19.
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C Twenty-First Centwy

'

Data regarding historical testation provides context for thinking about how the
law of wills has developed over time, but, of course, such data has little relevance to
how the law should be crafted today. Instead, policymakers should consult data
regarding the timing of contemporary testation. Two primary studies exist that shed
light on the timing of testation in the twenty-first century, one of which is an original
study conducted in contemplation of this article.23
i. Alameda County, CA - 2007
Professor David Horton conducted the first study of contemporary testation
when he surveyed the probate records of Alameda County, California, which
comprises most of the East region of the San Francisco Bay area, including the city
of Oakland. 23 2 This study focuses on decedents who died in 2007 and encompasses
a total of 324 wills.13 Horton's findings regarding the timing of testation are

summarized in Figure 7 below.234
Figure 7
ALAMEDA COUNTY, CA -2007
TIMING

NUMBER

PERCENTAGE

Day or Less
7 Days to I Day
I Month to 1 Week
1000 Days or Less
More than 1000 Days

3
6
14
108
216

0.9%
1.90/
4.3%
33.3%
66.7%

I

While the authors of the studies that analyzed nineteenth-century testation
highlighted the prevalence of late testation when summarizing their fndings,2 5
" The previous study of contemporary testation was conducted by Horton. See generally Horton
supra note 9 (discussing the costs and benefits of contemporary will construction doctrines, such as the
harmless error rule). The original study is presented in Section III.C.ii. In a recent article, Horton along
with Professor Reid Kress Weisbord, reported data regarding the timing of testation from a study of wills
probated in Sussex County, New Jersey in 2015. See Weisbord & Horton, supra note 144, at 689.
Howcvcr, the information provided in Weisbord and Horton's study is not as extensive as that which is
presented in the two studies that are the focus ofthis article.
Horton, supra note 9, at 1121.
m Id. Horton excluded all pour over wills (67 in total) from the sample that he analyzed. Id.
' Horton does not break his data down into the specific intervals found in Figure 7, but the numbers
and percentages in the first three rows of Figure 7 can be calculated from the information that Horton
provides. See id 1129-30. However, Horton does not provide the precise number of wills that were
executed before and after 1000 days. Instead, he simply reports: "Two-thirds of the individuals in my
study died more than a thousand days after signing their wills." Id at 1129. Two-thirds of the total 324
wills is exactly 216 wills. Thus, Figure 7 reports that 216 wills were executed more than three years before
death and that 108 wills were executed less than three years before death.
as See supra notes 195 & 205 and accompanying text.
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Horton notes the prevalence of early testation when he explains that his data
"indicates . . . that most testators engage in estate planning long before they pass
away."2 6 In particular, Horton reports that, although he found a few deathbed wills
23
in his sample,237 only 7.1% were executed within one month of the testator's death. 8

When the window is expanded beyond extremely late testation, Horton reports that
roughly 33.3% of wills were executed within a thousand days of death.239
As these numbers reveal, the vast majority of wills in Horton's sample were
executed more than a thousand days before the testator's death, as over two-thirds
were executed in this timeframe. 2 o Suggesting the prevalence of even earlier
testation, Horton reports that "the average gap between will execution and death was
a decade, and the median was seven years." 24 ' He also indicates that his sample
contained some cases of extremely early testation, including one will that was
executed over fifty years before the testator's death. 242 In sum, the prevalence of
extremely late testation that was found in previous studies of nineteenth century
testation has clearly been replaced in Horton's study by a prevalence of early
testation.
ii. Hamilton County, OH - 2014
While Horton's study sheds light on the timing of contemporary testation, Horton
himself acknowledges that his data does not fully illuminate the realities of probate.
He explains that "statistics from a single county are a pinprick of light in the vast
darkness of probate" and that "[o]ther parts of... the country may be experiencing
different trends."2 4 3 Consequently, additional data is needed to supplement Horton's

data so that a more complete picture of testation's timing might come into focus.
'TIerefore, to cast an additional ray of light on the darkness of probate generally
and the timing of testation specifically, this article reports the results of a second
original study of contemporary testation. This study surveys the probate records of
Hamilton County, Ohio, which includes Cincinnati and the surrounding metropolitan
area.244 The study analyzes an original data set of 1,824 wills that were submitted to
Hamilton County's probate court in 2014. This data set was compiled by reviewing
every probate matter that was opened in Hamilton County in 2014 through an

26

a Horton, supra note 9, at 1129. Hirsch points out that a "trickle of cases" in which "procrastinators
wills] only after they fall seriously ill . .. continues to appear in the law reports." Hirsch,
supra note 84, at 848-49.
237 See Horton, supra note 9, at 1130 (reporting that "nine [testators] perished the same week and
three [testators] passed on the same day" that they executed their wills).
m See id.
239
240 See id at 1129.
See Id.

rush to [cxecute

24

Id.

Id at 1129 n.212 (reporting that "[f]or some, the gap was significantly longer, such as Teena
will preceded her demise by more than a half-century").
Kools,
2 43 whose brisk 1954
242

d
2

" See Hamilton CowuntyAbota, HAMION COuNTY GovT, httpsJ www.hamiltoncountyohio.gov/about
[hitpsJperma.c/3AZ9-6ZXK].
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on-line database maintained by the county's probate court.245 This review produced
2,012 cases in which a will was submitted. From those roughly two thousand matters,
certain categories of cases were eliminated, the vast majority of which were cases in
which the testator died before 2013.2" Since the goal of this study is to provide a
better understanding of contemporary testation, only the wills of testators who died
in 2013 or 2014 were analyzed.2 47
Once the more than eighteen-hundred wills in this sample were identified, the
time at which each will was executed relative to the testator's death was calculated
using the date of death found in the online probate entry and the date of execution as
it appears on the copy of the will. If a testator executed a codicil to her original will,
the date of the last codicil was used to calculate the timing of testation. The findings
of this study are summarized in Figure 8 below.
Figure 8
HAMILTON COUNTY, OH -2014
TIMING

NUMBER

PERCENTAGE

I Day or Less
7 Days to 1 Day

2

0.1%

21

1.2%

1 Month to I Week

39

2.1%

1000 Days or Less
More than 1000 Days

480
1344

26.3%
73.7%

As this table illustrates, while they are rare, deathbed wills and other instances of
extremely late testation exist within the Hamilton County sample, with 3.4% of wills
being executed within the last month of the testator's life, 1.2% being executed
within the last week of life, and two out ofthe total 1,824 wils being executed within
one day of death. When a larger timeframe of late testation is considered, the study
reveals that 26.3% of wills in Hamilton County were executed within a thousand
days of the testator's death. Thus, like Horton's study, the sampling of Hamilton
County's probate records reveals the prevalence of early testation, with 73.7% of
wills executed more than a thousand days before the testator's death. Moreover, the
average number of years intervening execution and death was approximately nine
years, and the median number of intervening years was roughly seven and a half.
A comparison with Horton's study reveals general similarities between the
timing of testation in Alameda County, California in 2007 and Hamilton County,
Ohio in 2014. As Figure 9 shows below, most testators in both studies executed their

24 See Court Record Search, HAMILTON COuNEY PROB. Cr., https://www.probatect.org/courtrecords [https://perm&cefYFJ3-JAP8].
2 Other types of cases that were discarded include those in which the date of death was not provided
in the online probate record, those in which the date of will-execution was not clear from the will, and
cases in which the testator was domiciled outside of the state of Ohio at the time of death. It is also
noteworthy that pour over wills were included in this sample. Horton, by contrast, excluded pour over
wills. Horton, srpra note 8, at 1121.
' For instance, four testators died in the 1990's, and as such, their wills would provide little insight
into testation as it occurs today.
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wills more than three years before death, with 66.7% oftestators in Alameda County
and 73.7% in Hamilton County doing so. Likewise, a relatively small number in both
studies executed their wills within the last month of life. Specifically, 7.0% of wills
in Horton's study and 3.4% of wills in the Hamilton County study were less than a
month old. When placed within the context of Horton's study, the Hamilton County
data fits squarely within the modem trend away from extremely late testation and
towards earlier testation.
Figure 9
COMPARISON OF CA & OH
TIMING

CALFORNIA - 2007

OFo - 2014

1 Day or Less
7 Days to I Day

0.9%

0.1%

1 Month to I Week
1,000 Day or Less
More than 1,000 Days

4.3%
33.3%
66.7%

1.90/

7.1%

1.2%

3.4%

2.1%
26.3%
73.7%

Although the results from Alameda County, California and Hamilton County,
Ohio are similar, potentially important differences exist. In particular, the Hamilton
County results suggest that the rate of extremely late testation may continue to
decrease and that a corresponding increase in the rate of early testation may be
occurring. For instance, the rate of testators executing wills within the last month of
life in the Hamilton County study is roughly half of the rate found in Horton's study.
Likewise, the rate of wills executed more than a thousand days before death
increased from 66.7% in Horton's study to 73.7% in the Hamilton County study.
Therefore, a comparison of the two studies of contemporary testation not only
confirms the trend away from late testation but also suggests that the rate of early
testation may continue to increase.24 8
Moving beyond the thousand-day timeframe, the study of Hamilton County
reveals that extremely early testation is not uncommon. As summarized in Figure 10
below, a significant number of testators executed their wills extremely early in life
with 277 or 15.2% executing their wills over two decades before death and 102 or

I One difference in the composition of the respective samples examined in California and Ohio
could at least partially explain the increased rates of early testation. Specifically, the California sample
excludes pour over wills and the Ohio sample includes pour over wills. See supra notes 233 & 246. The
inclusion of pour over wills in the Ohio sample could produce higher rates of early testation because the
primary dispositive provisions of the testator's estate plan are found in the testator's revocable trust rather
than her will. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 463. Thus, testators of pour over wills can
update their estate plans by amending their trusts rather than their wills, and consequently wills that pour
over into a trust might be some of the oldest in the Ohio sample. Unfortunately, specific data regarding
the timing of execution of pour over wills was not collected as part of the Ohio study. The potential
consequences of including pour over wills in this study's sample highlights the need for researchers to
thoroughly consider whether to include or exclude pour over wills when conducting empirical studies of
probate records. See generally Mark Glover, Boilerplate in Pour-Over Wills, 104 Iowa L. Rev. Online
138 (2018), https://ilr.law.uiowaedu/online/ volume-103/boilerplate-in-pour-over-wills/.
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5.6% executing their wills over three decades before death. At the extreme end of
the spectrum, twenty-five wills, or 1.4%, were more than four decades old at the time
they became effective, with the earliest instance of testation occurring over fifty-five
years before the testator's death.
Figure 10
HAMILTON COUNTY, OH-2014
TIMING

NUMBER

PERCENTAGE

0 to 5 Years
5 to 10 Years
10 to 15 Years
15 to 20 Years
20 to 25 Years
25 to 30 Years
30 to 35 Years
35 to 40 Years
40 to 45 Years
45 to 50 Years
50 to 55 Years
55 to 60 Years

718
384
268
177
106
69
52
25
15
7
2
1

39.4%
21.1%
14.7%
9.7%
5.8%
3.8%
2.9%
1.4%
0.8%
0.4%
0.1%
0.06%

In sum, while consideration of testation's timing has theoretical implications for
how the law of wills should be crafted,2 49 policymakers need an understanding of
when testation actually occurs to adequately evaluate the possibility of reform. In
this regard, a review of the various studies of historical testation reveals that
extremely late testation was once prevalent,2" but beginning in the mid-twentieth
century, testators began to execute their wills earlier in life. This shift in testation's
timing is confirmed by studies of contemporary testation, including Horton's study
of Alameda County, California and this article's original study of Hamilton County,

Ohio; indeed, a comparison of the two studies suggests that the rate of early testation
25
may continue to grow. 1

IV. THE REFORM OF THE LAW OF WILLS

As explained previously, the conventional method of will-authentication

likely minimizes decision costs at the expense of fewer accurate decisions. 25 2
Conversely, the reform movement's proposal of harmless error is likely to more
accurately distinguish authentic wills from inauthentic wills, but this increased
accuracy might result in increased decision costs. 253 This article argues that
249

See supra Parts 1,11.

'See supra Section III.A and Subsections III.B.i, III.B.ii.
a See sqpraFigure 9.
m See supranotes 67-73, 80-84 and accompanying text.
a See supranotes 74-75, 85-89 and accompanying text
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policymakers must consider both the expected benefit of wills to determine which
method of will-authentication is optimal and that the timing of testation can provide
them evidence of a will's expected benefit. 25
The data presented in Part III suggests that the timing of testation, and therefore
the expected benefit of wills, has changed over time. The vast majority of testators
2
no longer wait until the last minute to execute their wills as they did in the past. 1s
2
Instead, testation increasingly occurs long before the testator's death. 5 With this
trend away from late testation and toward earlier testation clearly identified, the task
of determining how the law of will-authentication should be crafted in light of this
trend remains. This section therefore concludes the article by exploring whether
reform will better align the law of will-authentication with the realities of
contemporary testation.
A. Static Law andDecreasedRates ofLate Testation
Under both the conventional law and the harmless error rule, the method of
will-authentication is consistent for all wills. Put differently, the law of
will-authentication under both approaches is static. Under the conventional law, all
wills are subject to the same presumptions based upon whether they are formally
compliant. If a will complies with the prescribed formalities, the court presumes it to
be authentic, and if a will does not comply, it is subject to a conclusive presumption
of inauthenticity. 2" Likewise, under the harmless error rule, all wills are subject to
the same presumptions regarding authenticity, based upon whether the testator
complied with the prescribed formalities. If a will complies with the prescribed
formalities, the court presumes that it is authentic; if a will does not comply, it is
258
subject to a rebuttable presumption of inauthenticity.
Under these static approaches to will-authentication, the average expected benefit
of a will must be considered by policymakers when evaluating the costs and benefits
of a given will-authentication process. On the one hand, if the average expected
benefit of wills is low, then policymakers should not tolerate significant decision
costs because expending such costs will not produce substantial benefit. On the other
hand, if the average expected benefit of wills is high, then policymakers should
tolerate greater decision costs so that that the greater benefit is realized. In this
way, the average expected benefit of wills can inform how to craft a static
will-authentication method.
Consider, for example, the conventional law. If policymakers during the time of
its development were concerned that the benefit of accuracy was not significant, then
a goal of minimizing decision costs may have been warranted. Within this context
of historical testation, the timing of testation suggests that a low average expected
benefit of wills might, in fact, have played a role in the development of a
will-authentication process that minimizes decision costs. As explained previously,
a See supra Parts I, II.
' See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section III.C.
m See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
'
See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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a high frequency of late testation existed centuries ago during the conventional law's
development,25 9 and this prevalence of late testation produced a low average
expected benefit of wills.
In particular, extremely late testation raised the concern that the testator was
acutely susceptible to overreaching at the time she executed her will. 260 This
increased vulnerability, in turn, increased the risk that the testator's will did not
express her own intent but instead expressed the intent of someone else. Put
differently, the testator's increased susceptibility decreased the likelihood that the
will accurately reflected her intended estate plan, and as such, the expected benefit
ofmaking an accurate authenticity decision regarding the will was diminished. When
faced with these consequences of the time's prevalence of late testation, early
policymakers may have determined that they should not tolerate significant decision
costs during the will-authentication process, and therefore the conventional law may
have developed in response to these concerns in a way that favored efficiency over
accuracy.
Although a low average expected benefit of wills might generally explain the
development of the conventional law, and specifically the law's focus on minimizing
decision costs, it does not necessarily explain the conventional law's continuation
into modem day. If the average expected benefit of wills has increased since the
development of the conventional law, then greater decision costs should be tolerated
so that the greater expected benefit is realized. To decide whether the average
expected benefit ofwills has increased, policymakers must consult the data regarding
the timing of contemporary testation.
In this regard, the studies of contemporary testation reveal that testation's timing
has shifted away from the extremely late testation that was prevalent in earlier
times. 261 In the Alameda County study, only 7.1% of testators executed their wills
within the last month of life, and a mere 3.4% of Hamilton County testators executed
their wills within this timeframe. 262 Because testators no longer wait until their last
days to execute wills, today's policymakers should not worry about the implications
of late testation that might have shaped the conventional law. Indeed, the move away
from extremely late testation suggests that the average expected benefit of wills has
increased since the time of the conventional law's development, and therefore
policymakers should not be as concerned with minimizing decision costs because
the benefit of accurate will-authentication decisions likely has increased.
The trend away from extremely late testation therefore bolsters the reform
movement's argument in favor of the harmless error rule. Although reform could
increase costs associated with making will-authentication decisions," the harmless
error rule is likely more accurate at distinguishing authentic from inauthentic wills
than the conventional law. 26 Moreover, under contemporary conditions in which
testators no longer execute their wills extremely late in life, accuracy is more
a See supra Section HIA.
See supra Section l.B.
a See supranotes 250-251 and accompanying text.
m See supraFigure 9.
a See supranotes 80-94 and accompanying text.
2M
See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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beneficial because wills likely have a higher average expected benefit. Consequently,
even if decision costs increase under the harmless error rule, the timing of testation
suggests that this increase should be tolerated.
B. DynamicLaw and IncreasedRates of Early Testation
Although the studies of contemporary testation suggest that concerns regarding
extremely late testation have waned, they also suggest an emergence ofnew concerns
regarding extremely early testation. If testators execute wills so early in life that
changing circumstances cause their wills to diverge significantly from their intent at
death, then the trend away from late testation might not result in an increase in the
average expected benefit of wills.265 Certainly, the move away from extremely late
testation by some testators suggests an increase in the average expected benefit of
wills. However, the move by others toward extremely early testation suggests that
the net change in the average expected benefit of wills might be minimal or even
negative. Put simply, a prevalence of extremely late testation reduces the average
expected benefit of wills, but so does a prevalence of extremely early testation.
The data from Alameda and Hamilton Counties illuminates this concern
regarding a potential decline in the average expected benefit of wills. As explained
previously, both studies produced low rates of extremely late testation, with 7.1% of
Alameda County testators executing their wills within the last month of life and 3.4%
of Hamilton County testators doing so. Both studies also reveal increasingly high
rates of early testation. Horton found that two-thirds of the wills in the Alameda
County study were executed more than 1,000 days before the testator's death,' and
this article's study of Hamilton County found that 73.7% of wills were executed
26 7
within this timeframe.

Moreover, the Hamilton County study, which reports that substantial percentages
of wills were executed ten, fifteen, and twenty years before death, 26 raises even
greater concerns for policymakers. In particular, 39.6% of Hamilton County wills
were executed more than ten years before death; 2 4 .9 % were executed more than
fifteen years before death; and 15.1% were executed more than twenty years before
death."" These rates of early testation are troubling because the likelihood that a
will's terms match the testator's intent decreases as testation moves farther and
farther away from the testator's death. Simply put, the more time there is for
circumstances to change, the more likely a will becomes obsolete.
Based upon this data, it is difficult to precisely calculate the average expected
benefit of contemporary wills because it is unclear at what point early testation raises
significant concerns regarding changed circumstances. Perhaps the 1,000-day mark
See supra Section II.A.
See Horton, supra note 9, at 129.
m See supra Subsection Ill.C.ii.
'See supra Figure 10.
2'll ese percentages are derived from the information found in Figure 10. In particular, Figure 10
reveals that, of the 1,824 total wills in the sample, 722 were executed more than ten years before death,
454 were executed more than fifteen years before death, and 277 were executed more than twenty years
before death.
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'

that is used in both the Alameda County and Hamilton County studies is the most
significant cutoff point. However, a two-year timeframe or a five-year timeframe
might provide the most meaningful insights into the average expected benefit of
wills. Alternatively, perhaps policymakers should only be concerned with the ten,
fifteen, or twenty-year timeframes that are reported in the Hamilton County study.
Regardless of which timeframe is used, it is clear that reliable data regarding the
timing of testation provides a glimpse into when testation actually occurs, but the
task of calculating the average expected benefit of wills from such data is far from
straightforward.
If this concern regarding the difficulty of formulating a clear understanding of
the average expected benefit of wills in light of the increased rates of early testation
causes policymakers to reject a broad harmless error rule, the timing of testation can
still provide useful insights regarding how the law should be constructed. 270
Specifically, as an alternative to a harmless error rule that applies to all wills,
policymakers should consider a harmless error rule that applies only to a subset of
wills. In other words, instead of continuing a static method ofwill-authentication that
applies the same standards to all wills, policymakers should consider a dynamic
method of will-authentication that applies different standards to different wills. 27
While the data regarding contemporary testation might not be capable of
providing a clear picture of the average expected benefit of all wills, policymakers
can use the timing of testation to select a subset of wills that has the greatest average
expected benefit. For example, policymakers should be confident that wills executed
within the timeframe spanning one month to 1,000 days before the testator's death
have a greater average expected benefit than that of all wills. Within this window,
the problems associated with testator vulnerability are largely absent,2 72 and the
concerns regarding stale wills are diminished because relatively little opportunity
exists for the testator's circumstances to change.2 7 3 Policymakers should therefore

view this timing as falling within a sweet spot where testation is neither too early nor
too late.
Because wills that fall within this timing sweet spot have a relatively high average
expected benefit, policymakers should be more confident that the application of the
harmless error rule to these wills will produce an overall net benefit. Although
decision costs might increase as the court considers extrinsic evidence of a will's
authenticity, 274 these costs likely will be outweighed by the benefit of accurate
'To be clear, the average expected benefit ofwill is not the sole variable to consider when evaluating
a method ofwill-authentication. Consequently, even ifthe average expected benefit of wills is increasing,
reform might be warranted.
" Whereas this article suggests that a different standard ofcompliance with the prescribed formalities
could apply to wills depending upon the time at which they were executed, Hirsch has suggested that
different formalities should be required depending upon the situation in which the testator executes her
will. See Hirsch, srqpranote 84, at 863 ("This article proposes a new framework for formalizing rules,
founded not on the category of transfer but rather on the setting within which the transfer takes place.
Transfers that a party carries out on the spot, or delays with a long fuse, or makes on death's door, call for
different formalizing rules, irrespective of the substantive category into which the transfers fall.").
mSee supra Section II.B.
mSee supra Section B.A.
m See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text
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authenticity decisions regarding wills that possess a high average expected benefit.
The data from both Alameda County, California and Hamilton County, Ohio reveal
that a significant percentage of wills fall within this timeframe, and therefore that the
harmless error rule could be applied in a substantial number of cases. In particular,
26.2% of Alameda County testators executed their wills between one month and
1,000 days before death, and 22.9% ofHamilton County testators executed their wills
within this timeframe.Y 5
Therefore, if policymakers were to adopt a dynamic approach to harmless error
that applied only to wills executed within one month and 1,000 days before death, a
court could consider extrinsic evidence of authenticity for roughly a quarter of wills.
For the remaining three-quarters, the conventional law's rule of strict compliance
would remain. Through this type of dynamic will-authentication process,
policymakers might be more comfortable diverging from the conventional
law's insistence on strict compliance for all wills because they would have
greater confidence that reform will actually increase the benefit reaped by the
will-authentication process than they might have with reform that applies the
harmless error rule to all wills.
The adoption of a dynamic will-authentication process will not end the debate
regarding harmless error. Undoubtedly, some, if not many, proponents will argue
that the application of the harmless error rule to all wills will maximize the benefit
reaped by the will-authentication process. Others likely will argue that even if
harmless error should not be applied to all wills, the timing window in which wills
must fall to be eligible for harmless error should be expanded. Alternatively, critics
of reform might argue that the subset of wills that are eligible for harmless error
should be narrowed. Regardless of whether the debate regarding the appropriate
method of will-authentication continues, however, the recognition of a dynamic
approach highlights two key points. First, policymakers have reform options, other
than a broad harmless error rule, that will increase the net benefit of probating wills.
Second, the timing of testation can inform policymakers as to which option they
should chose.
CONCLUSION

The timing of testation has implications regarding the likelihood that a will
accurately reflects the testator's intent. If testation occurs early in the testator's life,
then changing circumstances might suggest that her will does not accurately reflect
her intent at death.2" If testation occurs late in life, then the testator's will might not
reflect her intended estate plan because old age or ill health have increased her
vulnerability to attempts of overreaching.2" Under both scenarios, testation's timing
provides insight into the extent to which the testator's intent will be fulfilled through
the distribution of the her estate in accordance with her will.

"MThese percentages are derived fron the data contained in Figure 9.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B.
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Put differently, the timing of testation provides evidence of the expected benefit
that the law will realize by probating a will. The expected benefit of wills, in turn,
can inform how the law of will-authentication should be crafted. When selecting a
method of will-authentication, policymakers should consider both the accuracy and
the efficiency of the process. On the one hand, the law's primary goal is to fulfill the
testator's intent,"' so policymakers should strive for a method of will-authentication
that accurately determines a will's authenticity. On the other hand, making accurate
authenticity decisions produces costs, as litigants and the court expend time, money,
and effort considering evidence of the testator's intent.279 After considering both the
benefit of making accurate will-authenticity decisions and the costs of making those
decisions, policymakers should choose the method of will-authentication that
produces the greatest net benefit.
When making this decision, policymakers have two primary options from which
to choose: the conventional law's rule of strict compliance and the reform
movement's harmless error rule. The conventional law's rule of strict compliance
directs the court to rely solely on formal evidence of the testator's intent.m Under
this approach, a will is deemed authentic if the testator complied with the prescribed
formalities, and it is deemed inauthentic if she did not'2 8 This streamlined process
of authenticating wills attempts to minimize decision costs by making the court's
task relatively simple and by removing all noncompliant wills from the court's
purview.28 2 This process, however, might not produce the most accurate decisions
because the court will invalidate a noncompliant will even if there is overwhelming
evidence that it is authentic."
By contrast, the reform movement's harmless error rule does not rely solely on
formal evidence of a will's authenticity. Like the conventional law, the harmless
error rule imposes a presumption of inauthenticity upon noncompliant wills, but
unlike the conventional law, this presumption is rebuttable.'" When a testator fails
to comply with the prescribed formalities the court presumes the will is inauthentic,
but it can consider extrinsic evidence that suggests the will is, in fact, authentic. By
transforming the presumption of inauthenticity from a conclusive presumption to a
rebuttable one, the reform movement seeks to increase the accuracy of the
will-authentication process.285 Critics argue, however, that the harmless error rule
could increase the cost and frequency of litigation regarding a will's authenticity.'
This argument suggests that even if the harmless error rule increases the accuracy of
the process, it might not result in a net benefit because the costs associated with
making authenticity decisions could increase.

m See RESTATEMET (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OIMER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
(AM. LAW INsT. 2003); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 1.

m See supranotes 85-94

and accompanying
See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying
nlSee Glover, supra note 28, at 625.
supranotes 80-84 and accompanying
m See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying
m See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying
See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying
m See supranotes 85--89 and accompanying
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To determine which method of will-authentication is optimal, policymakers need
to consider the expected benefit of wills. More specifically, policymakers need an
understanding of the likelihood that the testator's intended estate plan will be
fulfilled if an accurate authenticity decision is made.1 7 Consideration of the
theoretical implications of testation's timing is the first step in obtaining an
understanding of the expected benefit of wills, but policymakers must also consult
data regarding when testation occurs.2 88 Only then will they have a meaningful
assessment of the expected benefit of wills.
When data regarding contemporary testation is considered alongside data relating
to historical testation, a trend away from extremely late testation and toward earlier
testation emerges. 28 9 This trend suggests that wills more likely reflect the testator's
actual intent than they did at the time the conventional law developed.29 0 Because
the timing of testation suggests that today's wills likely have a greater average
expected benefit, policymakers should tolerate greater decision costs during the
authenticity process so that the law realizes the greater benefit of accurate
decisions. 2 9 1 Ultimately, the timing of contemporary testation suggests that the
conventional law's method of will authentication should be reformed to strike a
different balance between the twin concerns of accuracy and efficiency.

See
m See
'See
m See
291

supra Part II.
supra Part III.
supra Figure 6; Section III.C.
supra notes 259-260 and accompanying text.

See supra Part IV.

